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PROJECT
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW:
CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER RULE 10b-5
I.

STANDING TO SUE

Despite the broad language of section 10(b) of the Securities2
Exchange Act of 1934,' and of rule lOb-5 promulgated under it,
an investor who has suffered injury as a result of a securities fraud
might find the federal courts closed to him, not because he is a private litigant, for the right of a private party to bring an action was
upheld soon after the Act was promulgated,3 but rather because he
will be required to meet strict standing requirements. Under the
rule first articulated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,4 a plaintiff will not be allowed to maintain an action under rule 1Ob-5
unless he has purchased or sold securities.5
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). Section 10 (b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange1.

(b) "To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
[Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, all references to "section 10 (b)" are to section 10 (b)
of the '34 Act, 15 US.C. § 78j (b) (1970).]
2. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), first adopted in 1948 by the Securities
Exchange Commission under the authority of section 10(b), provides as follows:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
[Unless otherwise noted, references to "rule lOb-5" are to the SEC rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1977).]
3. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946), cited with
approval in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
4. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
5. The issue of standing to sue might be understood as a constitutional question-
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Almost from its inception this purchaser/seller requirement
was criticized as an arbitrary restriction upon private actions under
rule lOb-5. 6 But until 1975, when the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,7 the courts
generally interpreted the rule loosely,8 so that it presented less of
an obstacle than it does todayY Most recognized a number of exceptions that allowed otherwise-excluded potential plaintiffs to
whether the party bringing suit has sufficient interest in a real controversy with the defendant for the federal courts to have jurisdiction. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The Birnbaum
rule, requiring that the potential plaintiff under rule lOb-5 be a purchaser or seller of
securities, has sometimes been interpreted in this way. Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell,
464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972), for instance, holds it to be a constitutional requirement.
Eason v. General Motors Accep. Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1973), limited the question of standing to article III standing and identified a separate
issue-a zone of protected interests which it held was the principal concern of Birnbaum.
Id. at 657-58.
In the context of citizens suing governmental agencies under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970),
standing relates to this article III requirement of "injury in fact," Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 897 U.S. 150, 152 (1970), and "[wlhethcr the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Id. at 153.
But the standing issue is also concerned with whether the party who has been injured
comes within the class of those protected by the rule involved. This is required by the tort
doctrine that gives a cause of action where a statute is intended to protect the interests of
individuals and the protected interests are violated. RESTATEMENT oF ToRTs § 286 (1934).
It was on this doctrine that the private cause of action under lOb-5 was initially based.
See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970).
6. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968). A significant expansion of the class of potential plaintiffs
was effected by the elimination of the common law fraud requirement of privity. See
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Note,
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.: The Tippee of the Rule 10b-5
Iceberg, 5 Rtrr.-CAm. L.J. 256 (1974); Note, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner r
Smith, Inc.-Tipper and Tippee Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 29 Sw. L.J. 469 (1975). Blue
Chip has not cut back this expansion. See Baretge v. Barnett, 533 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1977).
For proposals of alternative rules to determine standing see Jacobs, The Role of Securities
Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the Regulation of CorporateManagement, 59 CORNELL L. REv.
27 (1973); Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant lOb-5 Developments, 2 SEc. REG. L.J. 805
(1975); Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24
HASTINcs L.J. 1007, 1048 (1978); Note, Securities Law-Rule lOb-5-They Had So Many
Plaintiffs They Didn't Know What to Do, 53 N.C.L. REv. 150 (1974); Note, Securities Law
-Fraud-Standing of Nonpurchasers and Nonsellers Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 256 (1976).
7. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
8. For examples of courts that expressed a strict interpretation of Birnbaum, see
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Haberman
v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1972).
9. For general reviews of standing until 1975, see Boone & McGowan, Standing to
Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEx. L. REv. 617 (1971); Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under
Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASnNGS L.J. 1007 (1973); Note, Securities
Law-Rule lOb-5-They Had So Many Plaintiffs They Didn't Know What to Do, 53
N.C.L. REv. 150 (1974).
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assert their claims. For example, courts granted standing to "forced
sellers,"' 1 parties to "abortive" transactions'- or corporate mergers,12 issuers of securities,' 3 and even representatives of purchasers
and sellers, such as shareholders in derivative actions,' 4 trustees in
bankruptcy,' 5 and trust beneficiaries. 16 Furthermore, an "equitable
relief" exception emerged: a plaintiff easily gained standing if he
sought an injunction, 7 8and was sometimes permitted to pursue
rescission or restitution.'
The movement toward liberal standing requirements climaxed
just prior to 1975. In Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps,'9
10. E.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); see text accompanying note 48 infra. But see, e.g,
Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 909 (1970); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11. E.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Greenstein
v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.),
aff'g 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D.
I1. 1967); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see text accompanying note 54 infra.
12. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967).
13. E.g., Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
14. Eg., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
15. Eg., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(state liquidator); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
16. E.g., James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Heyman v.
Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.
1972) (beneficial ownership of shares sufficient to grant standing).
17 E.g., Kahan v. Rosenteil, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLundon,
378 F.2d 783, 791 (8th Cir. 1967).
18. E.g., Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see FDIC v.
Felding, 309 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (D. Nev. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
19. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In this case the plaintiff,
Manor Drug Stores, was an offeree of a stock offer mandated by an anti-trust consent decree entered against Blue Chip Stamps. The plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus misled
them by pessimistically describing the financial status of Blue Chip and consequently discouraged them from participating. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
it was not necessary to invoke the purchaser/seller rule since it found that the plaintiffs
formed a definable class. The court held that the policy behind the Birnbaum rule, to
avoid difficult problems of proof, was adequately served by the existence of the consent
decree which, like a contract, precisely defined the class of persons, the price and quantity
of shares involved. Id. at 142. The decision sought to protect investors who are not actual
buyers if the functional equivalent of a contract (for example, a consent decree) exists
between the parties. The dissent sought strict adherence to the Birnbaum rule in order
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the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enunciated an exception
to the Birnbaum rule applicable in cases where certain policy objectives of that rule could be satisfied by an offer not resulting in a
purchase.20 The Seventh Circuit went even further in Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp.,21 rejecting the purchaser/seller
requirement in favor of a rule designed to protect investors.2 2 In
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,; however, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that other, more preeminent policy considerations required strict adherence to Birnbaum.24
Since Blue Chip, complainants seeking relief under rule 1Ob-5
have been blocked not merely by the letter of the Supreme Court's
decision, but also by its spirit, even in areas other than standing.2 1
to prevent the increase in strike suits that it predicted would result from the rule's elimination. Id. at 147 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 142. For a discussion of this point, see note 19 supra.
21. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 US. 960 (1973).
22. Id. at 659. In Eason, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the purchaser/seller requirement in allowing standing to guarantors of debts in a
securities transaction. The court formulated the question in the boldest terms:
For purposes of decision . . . we assume that the only purchase or sale of a
security involved in the transaction was the transfer of 7,000 shares of stock from
Bank Service to Waite, and we reject the suggestion that plaintiffs should be characterized as "sellers" of that stock. The question which is thus presented is whether,
notwithstanding the fact that they were neither purchasers nor sellers of a security,
plaintiffs may obtain relief under Rule lob-5.
Id. at 656. Plaintiffs in the case were individual shareholders of Bank Service. When Bank
Service bought a Pontiac dealership from Waite, it issued 7,000 shares and assumed his
liabilities, including notes payable to GMAC. The plaintiffs then individually delivered a
guarantee of those notes. Their complaint alleged fraud on the part of GMAC and Waite
in their representations as to the collectability of these debts.
In granting the plaintiffs standing, the court insisted that the class intended to be
protected by the '34 Act is broader than mere purchasers and sellers. It noted that rule
lOb-5 proscribes fraud or deceit upon "any person," and that it should be interpreted
broadly to effect its remedial purposes. Id. at 659 (relying on Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) and Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)). The intent of the rule should be preeminent, it held, even if
effecting that intent should happen to result in the speculated "flood" of securities litigation. Id. at 660-61. See Note, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Non-purchaser-Seller With a Vital
Stake in the Outcome of a Dispute Involving Fraud in Connection with the Purchase or
Sale of Securities Has Standing to Sue, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 688 (1974); Note, Standing to
Sue in lOb-5 Actions; Eason v. GMAC and its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 1131 (1974); Note, Securities Law-Seventh Circuit Repudiates the Birnbaum
Doctrine, Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), 1974
U. oF ILL. L.F. 521; Comment, Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5-Plaintiffs Who Are
Neither PurchasersNor Sellers of Securities May Recover Under Rule lOb-5 if Injured in
Their Capacity as Investors as a Direct Consequence of Fraud in Connection with a Securities Transaction,27 VAND. L. REV. 572 (1974).

23. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
24. Id. at 749.
25. For examples of cases invoking Blue Chip to resolve issues other than plaintiff's

1977)

RULE 10b-5

The objective of this section, therefore, is to review the post-Blue
Chip decisions of lower courts to determine whether the previously
developed exceptions to the Birnbaum rule still stand.
A.

26
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores

In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court held that an offer does not
qualify as a purchase for purposes of the Birnbaum rule and asserted that Birnbaum was properly decided. In support of its
conclusions, the Court relied upon: (1) practice in the lower courts
and implied congressional approval of the rule;2 8 (2) the legislative intent of the '34 Act as gleaned from the language of section
10(b), a comparison of the provisions within the '34 Act, and a
comparison of the '34 Act with the '33 Act;29 and (3) policy considerations confirming this interpretation."
Unfortunately, the opinion provided only limited direction to
the lower courts regarding the implementation of its holding.
Given the general inconsistency among pre-Blue Chip decisions,"the Court's reference to lower court decisions provides little guidance 2 But by concluding that Congress intended to exclude
"offers" from the protection of section 10(b)3 the Court limited
the remedial objective of the Act to protection of actual purchasers
and sellers of securities. It also limited the significance sometimes
attached to the words "in connection with" for purposes of standing under rule IOb-5. 4
standing, see Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Cal. 1976); Bio-Medical
Sci., Inc. v. Weinstein, 407 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
26. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For recent commentary on Blue Chip, see Note, Securities
Regulation-Rule lOb-5-Implied Private Cause of Action-Standing-Purchaseror Seller
Requirement-Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), 9 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 666 (1976); Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the
Purchaser-SellerProblem, 70 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 965 (1976); Note, Securities Law-FraudStanding of Nonpurchasers and Nonsellers Under Section 10(B) of the Securities Act of
1934, 1976 Wis. L. Rav. 256 (1976).
27. 421 U.S. at 749. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the requirement that there be a contractual relationship between the parties could be satisfied by the
offer because it served as the "functional equivalent" to a contract. 492 F.2d at 141-42.
28. 421 U.S. at 731-33.
29. Id. at 733-37.
80. Id. at 739-49.
31. Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue
Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BuFFALo L. Rav. 93 (1970).
32. Cf. Note, Standing to Sue for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws-The
Birnbaum Doctrine, 29 ARK. L. REv. 538, 545 (1976).
83. 421 U.S. at 749.
34. Under Eason, for instance, a "causation test " would have been substituted for
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The Court's discussion of policy considerations in Blue Chip
is most suggestive in interpreting the decision. Although the Court
did acknowledge the remedial purposes of the '34 Act and the need
for flexible interpretation of the Act to achieve these goals, 85 it
suggested that Eason gave insufficient weight to practical consid' and
erations, including the possibility of "vexatious litigation"80
the threat that plaintiffs could receive substantial damage awards
by relying solely on their own testimony concerning their past intentions. Because the Court's opinion gave such prominence to
these considerations, it can be inferred that Blue Chip requires a
strict interpretation of the Birnbaum rule.
Blue Chip renewed the importance of the definitions of "purchase" and "sale." However, the facts of Blue Chip required only
that the Court discuss the question of whether the statutory extension of the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" to include contracts
to purchase and sell would also include offers. Therefore the Court
did not further intimate, for instance, what types of transactions
might be included within the meaning of the phrases "or otherwise acquire" and "or otherwise dispose of" found in the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" in the '34 Act. 8
the purchaser-seller requirement. 490 F.2d at 659. See Note, Standing to Sue in 10b.5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NoTRE DAME LAW.
1131, 1140 (1974). See also Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, 290 F. Supp. 715, 718 (1968).
In Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967) the court stated that
it found "no justification in the legislative history of the Act or in the cases for reading
[section 10 (b)] as if it read merely 'in the purchase or sale' rather than 'in connection with
the purchase or sale.'" For comment upon the significance of the phrase with respect to
standing, see Note, Securities Regulation-Rule lob-5 Standing-A Non-Purchaser Fraudulently Induced to Forego His Right to Purchase Stock Under a Forced Option Granted
Pursuant to a Consent Decree Has Standing to Sue for Damages Under SEC Rule lOb-5Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), 8 GA. L. Rav. 487
(1974).
35. 421 U.S. at 749 n.14.
36.
We believe that the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious litigation
which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5 is
founded in something more substantial than the common complaint of the many
defendants who would prefer avoiding lawsuits entirely to either settling them or
trying them.
421 U.S. at 740.
37. Id. at 743. For considerations of the relationships between Eason and Blue Chip,
see Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. 111. 1975); Note, Securities Law-Rule
10b-5-The Birnbaum Doctrine is Affirmed: Only a Purchaser or Seller of Securities May
Maintaina Private Action for Monetary Damages Under Rule 10b-5. Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), 25 CAmH. U.L. Rav. 402, 408-16 (1976).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (13)-(14) (1970).
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B.

Standing Since Blue Chip
The admonition that the terms of the '34 Act are to be interpreted broadly in order to effect its remedial purposes39 remains
firm following Blue Chip. This rationale has supported some, 40
but not all, of the post-Blue Chip decisions that have confronted
the question of standing and the statutory definitions of purchase
and sale. In cases that have focused on a contractual relationship
in determining whether there was a purchase or a sale, standing
has been denied to shareholders who were offered warrants, 41 to

plaintiffs who had accepted a pledge of counterfeit stock certificates
as security for a loan,42 and to plaintiffs who had renewed their
participation in a limited partnership.4 3 On the other hand, courts
have granted standing to plaintiffs alleging legally insufficient oral
contracts, 44 and to plaintiffs who were paid no direct consideration
for the shares they delivered. 45 In another case the court determined that a contract was still executory and granted standing.46
In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court noted that a shareholder
plaintiff might avoid the Birnbaum rule by bringing a derivative
action on behalf of a corporate purchaser or seller if he had retained his stock because of the alleged fraud or had suffered economic loss because of the fraud on the corporation. 47 This acceptance of the "derivative action exception" from among the pre-Blue
Chip exceptions suggests that some of those exceptions might still
be allowed if they are within the policy enunciated in the Court's
opinion. The lower courts have been gradually working through
the exceptions, deciding which still apply.
1. Forced Sellers. The forced-seller exception, first enunciated in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,48 where a minority shareholder in a short-form merger had not sold his shares, but where
89.
40.
(2d Cir.
41.
42.
43.

Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
E.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 281-82
1975) (citing SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467) (1969).
Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1976).
Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see

Fischer v. New York Stock Exch., 408 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
44. Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing admonitions to interpret securities laws liberally and extending this to the interpretation of the meaning of
"contract"). Id. at 1176.
45. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275.
46. Ohashi v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. 421 U.S. at 738.
48. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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the shares had been converted into a claim for cash, has been applied in a post-Blue Chip, non-merger case, Murphey v. Hillwood
Villa Association.0 The security involved in Murphey was an interest in a limited partnership which had been forfeited because of
the alleged fraud.50 In granting standing, the court implicitly recognized that the forced seller situation does not present the sort of
evidentiary problems that troubled the Supreme Court in Blue
Chip.5 ' The difficult question in the case was whether the forfeiture
had been a sale. The court addressed it by invoking the phrase,
"contract to . . . dispose of," which appears in the definition of
"'sale" in the '34 Act. 2 It held that a provision for forfeiture upon
the happening of specific events is sufficient to support a disposition consistent with the demands of the Birnbaum rule."'
2. Abortive transactions.Since Blue Chip, plaintiffs who invoke the "abortive transaction" exception, alleging that a fraud
induced them not to sell their shares, have been required-as they
were even before Blue Chip54 -to show that a contract existed between the parties at the time of the alleged fraud. In several cases
the courts have not found the requisite contract.
In Ohashi v. Verit Industries,55 the plaintiff attempted to gain
standing by alleging that the defendant's fraud had prevented him
from selling his stock to third parties. The court, citing Blue
Chip,561 denied standing, seemingly because the plaintiff had no
contract to sell with these third parties.5 7 In Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc.,5 8 a similar situation arose. 0 In this case, the court
held that the purported shareholder agreement did not cover the
transaction in question. Accordingly, it denied standing.0 In Gauer
49. 411 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
50. Id. at 292.
51. See Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failureto Solve the PurchaserSeller Problem, supra note 26, at 988.

52.

15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(14) (1970).

53.

411 F. Supp. at 292-93. Accord, Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, 46 U.S.L.W. 2083

(D.D.C. July 20, 1977).
54. See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); Lanning v.
Serwold, 474 F.2d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
at 345; Note, supranote 51, at 992.

55. 536 F.2d 849.
56.
57.
decision.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 852.
Although this fact was not mentioned by the court, it seems implicit in its
540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 189.
Id. at 192-93.
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v. Genesco, Inc.,61 the plaintiff was also denied standing. The
court held that a "come along" contract 62 between the plaintiff and
the issuer of the security involved, was a contract between potential
sellers and not, therefore, the "contract to sell" which qualifies as
a "sale" under the definition in the '34 Act.
3. Derivative Actions. Although the derivative action exception expands the plaintiff class-an "evil" generally sought to be
avoided by the Blue Chip Court-it was approved in Blue Chip
for cases in which the corporation is a purchaser or seller of securities." A corporation may be a purchaser or seller as an issuer of
stock 4 or as a party to a merger.65 The post-Blue Chip courts have
continued to allow this exception.66
In one case, however, Walner v. Friedman,67 the plaintiffs
were denied access to the court even though they had sued derivatively, because the damages they had alleged" did not result from
the corporation's activities as a purchaser or seller of securities.
The plaintiffs had argued that Blue Chip was limited to class action suits and would, therefore, allow derivative actions even where
there was no corporate sale of securities.
4. Bankruptcy Trustees. Although the question of standing
for a trustee in bankruptcy was not discussed in Blue Chip, it
seems that the same considerations that permit the derivative action exception should also support this exception, since the courts
have not treated the trustee in bankruptcy as presenting a special
case. Post-Blue Chip cases involving trustees in bankruptcy have
focused upon the purchaser/seller status of the party represented:
the representative's status has not even been challenged.69
61. [1975-76] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,344 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
62. Under the original agreement to purchase Genesco shares, the plaintiff had a
right, if he desired to sell his shares and it was determined that registration under the
'33 Act was necessary before sale, to have such stock included in any registration made by
Genesco, at the corporation's expense. Id.
63. 421 U.S. at 738.
64. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
66. See, e.g., Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976); Kushner v. First
Pa. Corp., 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976); Harriman v. EJ. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411
F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975).
67. 410 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68. Plaintiffs alleged harm to the corporate reputation and public image following
SEC action against the corporation. Id. at 31.
69. See, e.g., Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir,
1976); Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975).
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5. The Equitable Relief Exception. Before Blue Chip, nonselling shareholders were permitted to sue for injunctive relief to
effect the policies of the '34 Act. Their position as shareholders0
was considered to make them the logical parties to bring sUit.7
Unfortunately, Blue Chip provides conflicting indications regarding the fate of this exception. Despite considerable lower court
support,7 1 and notwithstanding the fact that the Blue Chip decision
is limited to private damage actions,72 this exception involves many
of the same concerns that led the Supreme Court to reaffirm the
Birnbaum rule in actions for damages. It relies upon a broader
view of the protected class than that espoused in Blue Chip, since
the rationale of the exception is to protect investors from future
fraud. 3 It also leaves corporations open to discovery and potential
harassment.
The post-Blue Chip cases reveal only that the survival of the
injunctive relief exception is uncertain.7 4 For example, in Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 751 minority shareholders
brought a derivative action to enjoin a proposed merger. In dicta,
the court noted that the Blue Chip holding is limited to damage
actions and cited this distinction as lending support to its decision.76 But, it reached its decision on other grounds. It held that a
merger is a sale, that Du Pont's contract to buy and sell stocks was
equivalent to a sale, even though the merger was incomplete, and
that the resolution of the Board of Directors was sufficient to satisfy the sale requirement.7 7 Accordingly, it granted standing without relying only on the exception.
In Davis v. Davis, 7 the court took a similar approach, resting

its decision to grant standing upon a shareholder's agreement and
the broad definition of "sale" in the '34 Act. As support for this
70. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 950 (1970). In
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), the court permitted
standing for injunctive relief because the case did not present proof of loss or causal connection issues, as well as because of the "logical plaintiffs" rationale.
71. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
72. 421 U.S. at 727.
73. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d at 547.
74. Compare this finding with the prediction made in Note, Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores: The Future of Standing Under Rule 10-b5, 61 IoWA L. Rav. 497, 541
(1975), that Blue Chip would have no effect upon the injunctive relief exception.
75. 411 F. Supp. 133.
76. Id. at 157.
77. Id.
78. 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976).
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holding, the court cited cases which hold that the buyer/seller requirement is not as critical in an action for injunctive relief as it
is in an action for damages. 79
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois directly addressed the continued viability of the injunctive relief
exception in Wright v. Heizer.0 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had only shortly before, in Eason, adopted the
investor theory as a substitute for the Birnbaum rule. In the wake
of Blue Chip, the district court retreated from Eason and invoked
the "spirit" of Blue Chip when it denied that a distinction between law and equity should permit an exception to the Birnbaum
rule."' Since the petitioners were not purchasers or sellers in this
case, they were not permitted standing despite their invocation of
the exception.
D.

Conclusion

Blue Chip severely limited the earlier Supreme Court proposition that the securities laws are to be interpreted flexibly to
achieve their remedial purposes.8 2 According to Blue Chip, this
rule of construction protects only purchasers and sellers of securities. 3 The flexibility that remains for expansive construction lies in
the development of non-conventional definitions of "purchase,"
"sale," and "contract." Predictably, much of the attention of the
lower courts has focused upon these terms.8 4
Since Blue Chip the courts have hesitated simply to invoke
the pre-Blue Chip exceptions to the Birnbaum rule. Rather they
have reconsidered many of them to determine whether they are
still viable. Derivative actions and other representative actions
have presented the least difficulty since the former, at least, were
approved explicitly by the Supreme Court.85 But, when faced with
a forced seller or an abortive transaction, the courts tend to invoke
the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale." In many cases
79. Id. Here "in connection with" is interpreted as a standard for determining
whether or not the scheme sufficiently "touches" the contracts to sell for them to be in
connection with the scheme. Id. at 1290.
80. 411 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. IlI. 1975).
81.

Id. at 34.

82.
83.
84.
85.

See
See
See
See

text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying

notes 33-34 supra.
notes 35-38 supra.
notes 40-46 supra.
notes 63-69 supra.
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they have granted standing if there was a contract to sell between
the parties. ""
Blue Chip has also rendered confusing the situations where
the injunctive relief exception would have previously been employed. Unfortunately, the sale upon which standing would rest is
still in the future. Further difficulty inheres because this exception
was not explicitly approved by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip.
Confronted with this situation, the courts search for the "magic"
contract.8 7 Failing to find it, a court may well deny standing. "
Although the Supreme Court did identify policy considerations
which support the Birnbaum rule in private damage actions, it did
not consider the countervailing policy considerations that lend support to the injunctive relief exception. No large damage claims are
involved, and permitting non-selling shareholders to bring suit
effects the purposes of the '34 Act by preventing fraudulent transactions which would give subsequent purchasers and sellers a valid
1Ob-5 claim.89 When the issue is again faced squarely it can be expected that the exception will survive.

II.

MATERIALITY

The language in rule 1Ob-5 explicitly includes proof of the
materiality of an alleged misstatement or omission as an element of
a cause of action under the ruleY Although the term "material"
has been defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for use in a different context,9 1 the definition and applica86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See
See
See
See

text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

48-62
74-79
80-81
70-78

supra.
supra.
supra.
supra.

It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) (emphasis added). For the full text of rule lOb-5, see note 2
supra.
The materiality requirement is supported by the legislative history of the '34 Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in IIA-Pt. 2C BUSINESS ORGANIZAT5ONS

5-3, 5-13 (N. Gadsby ed. 1971).

91. All material information must be included in registration statements filed under
section 12 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (b) (1970). "Material"
is defined there as "those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably
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tion of the word material in rule 1Ob-5 cases has been formulated
by the courts. This definitional process has not been an easy one.
Despite earlier Supreme Court cases that appeared to define "materiality," 92 the questions surrounding the definition were not resolved until 1976 when the Supreme Court, in TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,93 declared a definite standard for determining materiality. 4 This section considers the evolution of the
definition of "materiality" and analyzes the TSC Industries decision with a view toward its probable impact on future cases brought
under rule 1Ob-5.
to be informed before buying or selling the security registered." Rule 12b-2 (), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (j) (1977). The same definition is employed in rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230A05
(1977), regarding information included in registration statements required under the '33
Act. Professor Homer Kripke has suggested that the courts have "conveniently ignored"
this SEC definition. Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1061, 1069 (1971). For a fuller discussion of the public policy behind disclosure see Knauss,
A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure, 62 MicH. L. Rv. 607 (1964).
92. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court considered a case brought under rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977), and concluded that:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be
"material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have
been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of
deciding bow to vote. This requirement that the defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process is found in the express terms of Rule 14a-9,
and it adequately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be
established by proof of a defect too trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for
which approval is sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of liability
would not further the interests protected by section 14(a).
396 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added). Although the Mills Court interpreted materiality in a
cause of action brought under the proxy rules, it has been stated that the element of materiality is common to both rule lOb-5 and rule 14a-9. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub noma.Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Ad. &
Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 695-96 (2d Cir. 1973).
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), a rule lOb-5 action
brought by a group of American Indians, the Supreme Court considered materiality in a
case involving the creation of a secondary market for shares in the Ute Development Corporation (UDC) by employees of the bank acting as transfer agent for UDC. The bank
employees purchased shares from the Indians and resold them to non-Indian buyers at
prices generally higher than those paid the Indian sellers. The Court concluded that:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of this decision.
Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). The Court cited the Mills decision as well as the
decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969), in support of the "might" standard.
93. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
94. See text accompanying notes 125-32 infra.
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The Search for a Standard

The difficulties in defining "materiality" are illustrated by
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,95 a case involving both misstatements and omissions. In defining "materiality," the Second Circuit
panel attempted to balance the ideals of the '34 Act" and the
practical considerations of a corporation operating in the securities
markets. 7 The first formulation of a definition by the court9 8
merely restated the "would" standard. 9 After discussing illustrative examples of material facts, the court rephrased the definition
of "materiality" as one "which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities."'10 0 Thus, the court, by using both a "would" and a "might" '
standard for determining materiality, created a conflict which persisted until TSC Industries.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court, Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co.' 0 2 and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 0 3 exacerbated the ambiguity between the two standards. In these decisions,
the Court appeared to establish a "might" standard for determining
materiality both under rule 14a-910 4 and rule IOb-5.'0 5 In so doing,
95. 401 F.2d 833.
96. The legislative history of section 10 (b) indicates that one of the purposes of that
section was to prohibit deceptive devices used in connection with securities transactions.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 90, at 11.
97. The difficulties facing corporations are pointed out in the dissent of Judges
Moore and Lumbard in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 870-89.
98. Id. at 849.
99. This "would" standard was drawn from List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The List court defined a material fact in terms
of "whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to it] . . .in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question." 340 F.2d at 462 (emphasis added). The
List court, in turn, drew its definition of materiality from the Restatement of Torts which
defines materiality as follows:
A fact is material if
(a) its existence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would
attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538 (2)

(1934).

100. 401 F.2d at 849.
101. The terms "would" and "might" in reference to standards of materiality are
generally accepted. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 91; Note, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule 10b-5, 1973 UTAH L. Ruv. 119 (1973).
102. 396 U.S. 375.
103. 406 U.S. 128.
104. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375. See note 92 supra.
105. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128. See note 90 supra.
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the Supreme Court appeared to approve by implication the "might'
standard in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
The difference between the "might" and "would" standards
could have a serious impact on litigation strategy in actions brought
under rule 1Ob-5. For example, the difference between the "might"
and "would" standards could affect a motion for summary judgment: 10 "the 'might have' test would ask whether a reasonable
mind could conclude that the omitted fact is so irrelevant that it
would never reasonably be considered important;' 11

the "would"

standard would question whether the omitted or misrepresented
fact was so relevant that the mind of the investor, as a matter of
course, would probably consider it of substantial importance.'
Clearly, some facts that would be considered material under the
"might" standard could not also satisfy the narrower "would"
standard. Therefore, establishment of the "would" test would result in fewer successful motions for summary judgment by plaintiffs.
The difference is also reflected in the plaintiff's burden of
proof. The court of appeals in Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries,
Inc.10 argued that "[u]nder a probability test, we cannot see how
the plaintiff would prevail without introducing some evidence,
direct or indirect, tending to show that the challenged omission
[or misrepresentation] had an actual impact in his case."" 0 This
would not be the case under the "might" standard, in which a
showing that the challenged fact may have had sorhe impact in the
plaintiff's investment decision would allow a plaintiff to prevail.
Thus, the higher threshold imposed by the "would" standard makes
a considerable difference to a plaintiff seeking damages for violations of rule 1Ob-5.
The two standards of materiality resulted in a difference of
opinion between the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of ApFED. R. Civ. P. 56.
107. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
108. The need to show probability was suggested in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court stated that the "difference between 'might'
and 'would' may seem gossamer" but "[w]hen account is taken of the heavy damages that
may be imposed, a standard tending toward probability rather than toward mere possibility is more appropriate." Id. at 1302.
109. 512 F.2d 324.
110. Id. at 331 n.13. The language of the court must be read narrowly; a broad reading would tend to equate materiality with reliance. Materiality and reliance are distinguished in text accompanying note 134 infra.
106.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

peals. The Second Circuit, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,11' 1
in an opinion by Judge Friendly, held firmly for the "would"
standard. The opinion explicitly rejected the "might" language of
Mills 12 and Affiliated Ute"ls as dicta, 114 stressing that the Mills

Court did not intend to "establish a definition of materiality" by its
discussion of the "might" standard.", The court had more difficulty
distinguishing the "might" language of Affiliated Ute, but found
that the case did not involve any issue of materiality." 0
In Kohler v. Kohler Co.," 7 the Seventh Circuit held that a
person "must scrupulously disclose . . . those material facts about

a corporation's business which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities."" 8 In cases decided after Kohler, the Seventh Circuit continued to employ the "might" standard."0 In Northway, Inc. v.
TSC Industries, Inc., 20 an action brought under rule 14a-9,12 1 it
stated:
[w]e believe the policies which underlie § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 are
best served by a test that includes all facts which a reasonable stockholder might consider important .... [W]e think any test which

does not require the inclusion of facts which could influence a
reasonable stockholder would seriously undercut
the intended pro122
phylactic effect of these disclosure provisions.
B.

23
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.1

This confusion between the circuits was ripe for resolution in
1976 when the Supreme Court issued its decision in TSC Industries. Although the Court apparently had established the "might"
111. 478F.2d 1281.
112. 396 U.S. 375.
113. 406 U.S. 128.
114. 478 F.2d at 1301-02.
115. Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 1302 n.21.
117. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
118. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
119. Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973); Dasho
v.Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11.
120. 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977). For a discussion of the materiality element of rule
14a-9 and the corresponding element of rule 10b-5, see note 92 supra.

122. 512 F.2d at 330.
123. 426 U.S. 438.
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standard in Mills and Affiliated Ute, the conflict between the Second and Seventh Circuit definitions of materiality invited further
comment by the Court. In reviewing the decision of the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court first denied that Mills1 24 had established a "might" standard, stating that any reference to materiality
in Mills was merely preliminary to the Court's consideration of the
need for reliance. 2 5 A similar fate awaited the language that appeared to condone a "might" standard in Affiliated Ute. The Court
said that the discussion of the "might" standard was intended to
show that when materiality was established in a nondisclosure case,
proof of reliance was not necessary. 2 6 Having deftly cleared the
slate of its earlier decisions, the Court proceeded to establish the
"would" standard:
The general standard of materiality that we think best comports
with the policies of rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote....

It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure
of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to
change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing
of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available. 12 7
By this language the Supreme Court left no doubt as to the standard for determining materiality in the future. However, the Court
was not content merely to resolve the issue before it. It also offered
advice on the application of the standard:
The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question
of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal
standard to a particular set of facts. In considering whether summary judgment on the issue is appropriate, we must bear in mind
that the underlying objective facts, which will often be free from
dispute, are merely the starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality. The determination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from
124. 396 U.S. 375.
125. 426 U.S. at 447.
126. Id. at 450.
127. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
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a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him,
and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact. Only
if the established omissions are 'so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality' is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved
'as a matter of law' by summary judgment. 28

The holding of the Supreme Court in TSC Industries is perplexing in light of the Court's statement in Affiliated Ute that the
underlying purpose of the '34 Act is "to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."' 29 Apparently, the Court has raised the threshold of proof
needed to demonstrate successfully that the defendant did not make
full disclosure. Under TSC Industries, evaluation of the amount
of disclosure made by a defendant must include the "total mix" of
all the information disclosed to a plaintiff rather than the disclosure
made by a single party. In Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries,Inc.,8 0
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[t]o prevail on
the 14a-9 issue Northway [the plaintiff] must establish undisputed
facts sufficient to show that one or more of the omitted items is
material as a matter of law."'' Under the Supreme Court's "total
mix" theory, the plaintiff would have to show that one or more of
the alleged omissions or misrepresentations was material in light
of all information available to him. The "total mix" theory allows
the defendant to counter a showing of a single material omission
or misstatement with a showing that other facts which should have
corrected the prior false or misleading information were available
to the plaintiff.
C.

Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the "would" standard and the
mandate for its application enunciated by TSC Industries will
limit the number of actions brought under rule 1Ob-5. It will be
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on motions for summary judg-

ment,132 and the additional expenses of lengthy trials will pose a
burden both to plaintiff and defendant. Furthermore, settlements
128. Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186

(1963)).
130. 512 F.2d 324.
131. Id. at 329.
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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initiated by plaintiffs will be more likely following a motion to dismiss. 133 The conclusion to be drawn from TSC Industries is that
the Supreme Court has successfully made it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert actions under rule 1Ob-5 in which the facts in question
are not clearly of major significance in the investment decision.

III.

RELIANCE

In actions brought under rule lOb-5, reliance is distinguished
from materiality. Reliance is judged by whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently had he known the undisclosed or misrepresented information, whereas materiality is determined by whether the reasonable man would have attached importance to the information in choosing his course of action. 134 Proof
of reliance is not expressly required as an element of a cause of
action brought under rule 1Ob-5, 13 nor can the requirement clearly
be deduced from the legislative history of the '34 Act; 3 6 rather, it
has evolved exclusively in case law. 37 Its history reflects a continual
struggle to define precisely the elements of a cause of action under
rule 1 Ob-5. This struggle was complicated by the necessity of preserving both the deterrent 38 and compensatory' 39 purposes of the
133. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b).
134. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Ketchum v. Green, 415 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1976). Materiality in rule
lOb-5 cases is discussed in the text accompanying notes 90-133 supra.
135. See text of rule lOb-5, supra note 2.
136. See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITiEs REGULATION 1765-66 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Reliance
Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 CoLuM. L. REv. 562, 564
(1972). Contra, Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 288 (3d Cir. 1972).
137. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965), one of the early statements of the principle, the court held that to make out a
prima fade case the plaintiff must show that he would not have acted as he had but for
the misstatement or omission. Reliance has been sometimes equated to the causation in
fact requirement in common law tort actions. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 136, at 1759-63;
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner S. Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). For examples of how reliance and
causation in fact may differ, see Note, Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.-The Tenth Circuit Resurrects Reliance in a lOb-5 Nondisclosure Case, 1973
UTAH L. REv. 862, 866 (1973).
138. Without some showing of reliance or causation, defendants would be unconditional guarantors of all plaintiffs' losses, even those that were not caused by the wrong
committed. As Professor Loss has stated: "Civil actions differ from administrative proceedings under the rule [10b-5], whose aim is to deter misconduct by insiders rather than
to compensate their victims." 6 L. Loss, supra note 136, at 3877 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
139. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the Supreme Court, in emphasizing the compensatory aspect of rule lOb-5 stated that the rule
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statute. On one hand, the cases reflect a fear that a rigid, mechanical standard of proof of reliance would be so difficult to satisfy that
deserving plaintiffs might be barred from recovery. On the other
hand, the cases also evince apprehension that unwarranted flexibility in the standards of proof might result in virtually unlimited
recovery by an unacceptably large class of plaintiffs, and provide an
unwarranted windfall to plaintiff investors. At present, there is no
agreement among the circuits or, in some cases, even within a particular circuit, 14° as to the requirements for proof of reliance. The
purpose of this section is to update the most recent developments
regarding the requirement and to provide some guidance as to its
probable future effect.
A.

Nondisclosure Cases
The Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
StatesM laid the cornerstone for the "modern"142 reliance requirement in nondisclosure cases. There the Court held that in a case
"involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance
is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this decision."'

43

In stating that reliance in nondisclosure cases is not necessary, 4 4 the Court required that a presumption of reliance arise if
should be construed "not technically and restrictively but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195.
140. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1975); Competitive
Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975);
Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1975), discussed in Note, Securities
Regulation-Two Different Standards of Reliance Applied in Individual Private Damage
Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5 by the Second Circuit, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 182 (1975).
141. 406 U.S. 128.
142. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had earlier developed a more
stringent reliance requirement in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cart.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), where a bifurcated standard was adopted. Under that holding
the plaintiff had to allege and prove both objective and subjective reliance. The former
requirement was proved simply by a showing of materiality, but the latter required that
the plaintiff show that he would not have acted as he had but for the misstatement or
omission. Five years later the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit eased the reliance
requirement in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), emphasizing
consideration of the behavior of a reasonable man in plaintiff's position if the undisclosed
fact had been made known. There ensued a conflict between the circuits as to whether to
adopt the more progressive holding in Chasins or the more rigid standards of List in omission cases. This question was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute.
143. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
144. Even this explicit position has been followed less than religiously. In Financial
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the omission is: (1) material, and (2) of such nature that a reasonably prudent man would have acted differently had the omitted
facts been known.145 Underlying the Court's holding was the recognition of the enormous difficulty inherent in proving reliance in
cases in which plaintiffs allege a material omission.
B. MisrepresentationCases
It has been generally acknowledged since Affiliated Ute that
the standards of proof for rule 1Ob-5 cases in which plaintiffs allege
misrepresentations differ from those where plaintiffs allege omissions.' 48 A plaintiff alleging misrepresentation faces a heavier burden of proof than would his counterpart in an omission case. He
must demonstrate that he actually relied on the alleged misrepresentation when he entered into the transaction that caused him
harm. 47 Some courts have attempted to ease this burden by creatdefinition of omission in cases ining and applying an expansive
8
volving misrepresentations.

4

Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973), the Tenth Circuit showed its continued reluctance to accept the elimination of the reliance requirement in omission cases stating in dicta that "[t]o prevail the
plaintiff in this silence case had the burden of proof to establish that it . .. relied to its
detriment" upon defendants' inaction. 474 F.2d at 521. See also Simon v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1973); Green v. Jonhop, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. Ore. 1973); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 574,
583 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
145. For a discussion of the holding in Affiliated Ute see Stoll, Reliance as an Element in 10b-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REV. 169, 176-77 (1974); Note, Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States-the Supreme Court Speaks on Rule 10b-5, supra note 101.
146. See Schlick v. Penn.-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974); Reeder v.
Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cn. L. Rv. 824, 841-42 (1965). Contra, Allen
Organ Co. v. North Amer. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (El). Pa. 1973) (where
the court stated, "Moreover, it is now well established that proof of reliance need not be
shown in a Section 10 (b) cause of action and causation is satisfied by a showing that the
); Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 59
facts misrepresented or withheld are material .
F.R.D. 396, 401 (ED. Pa. 1973).
147. In McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077 (D. Del. 1976), the plaintiff
had confidence in both the product itself and in the incumbent management. However,
his only objective criterion for investment was a report issued by the company containing
misrepresentations. In granting relief to plaintiff, the court held that there was no requirement that the plaintiff establish sole reliance or even primary reliance upon the audit but
only that it was a substantial factor in his decision.
148. This can be accomplished because the terms overlap. As the court in Little v.
First Cal. Co., 532 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1976), stated: "The categories of 'omission' and
'misrepresentation' are not mutually exclusive. All misrepresentations are also nondisclosures, at least to the extent that there is a failure to disclose which facts in the representation are not true." Id. at 1304 nA. See Note, Securities Law-Securities Fraud-Proofof
Reliance is Unnecessary in Open Market Transactions Under 10b-5, 29 VAND. L. Rav. 287,
297 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Reliance in the Open Market].
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Bolstered by the Supreme Court's holding in Affiliated Ute,140
the lower courts have also been willing to presume reliance in misstatement cases which posed difficult proof problems for the plaintiff.150 The development of the open market exception stands as the
primary example of the courts' attempt to ease the proof problems
by applying this presumption. 151 Under this exception, proof by
plaintiff that the alleged misrepresentation had an effect on the
securities market raises a presumption of reliance upon a showing
of injury by plaintiff. The rationale for this open market principle
essentially is that whatever his motivation for trading, the purchaser/seller relies "on the supposition that the market price is
validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially
inflated the price .

Corp.,1es

. . ."

In Reeder v. Mastercraft Electronics

the court acknowledged that proof of "reliance is still
generally required in misrepresentation cases,"' r but held that if
the plaintiffs purchased on the open market the reliance requiremexit had little relevance. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also adopted this position in Blackie v. Barrack.' In
Blackie, the defendant company issued an annual report in 1970
revealing profits of $12 million, but in 1972 reported a loss of $90
million. 56 Plaintiffs brought a class action encompassing all those
who purchased the company's stock between the release of the
1970 and 1972 annual reports alleging misrepresentations of the
corporation's financial well being in the 45 documents issued during that period. 57 In rejecting defendant's contention that individual questions of reliance and damages predominate over any
common questions, the appellate court held:
149. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
150. The Supreme Court itself lent tangential support for this approach in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), in which it held that reliance in both omission
and misrepresentation cases was proved by a showing of materiality in a shareholder suit
under section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
151. See generally Note, Reliance in the Open Market, supra note 148; Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Reliance in Private Actions].
152. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). Note that Blackie makes
explicit that in the open market situation the reliance of the plaintiff is not relevant to
causation, since it was the reliance of the investors who traded on the basis of the misstatement which affected the market price. All that is required to forge the causal link is
proof of purchase and the materiality of the misrepresentations.
153. 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
154. Id. at581.
155. 524 F.2d 891.
156. Id. at 894.
157. Id. at 902.
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[C]ausation is adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of
misrepresentations, without direct proof of reliance. Materiality
circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market traders and
hence the inflation in the stock price-when the purchase is made
the causational chain between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
loss is sufficiently established to make out a prima facie case. 158
Although the court allowed reliance to be presumed for the class, it
required that the issue of individual damages be tried separately. 59

C.

Rebutting the Presumption

The most common interpretation of the holding in Affiliated
Ute6 0 is that the case established a rebuttable presumption of reli02
ance in nondisclosure cases.' 6 ' In Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
We do not read [Affiliated Ute] to say that the question of reliance
vel non may not be considered at all in a non-disclosure case, but
only that proof of reliance is not required for recovery. If defendant is able to demonstrate that there was clearly no reliance ...
then the non-disclosure cannot be said to have caused the subsequent loss and under ordinary principles of the law of fraud, recovery shall be denied.16

In effect the courts require that a defendant disprove transaction
causation"- in order to rebut the presumption of reliance. 6 5 By
thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, a plaintiff is
relieved of difficult proof problems, while the defendant is still
afforded an opportunity to avoid liability in cases where there was
clearly no reliance. Defendants can rebut the presumption of reliance arising from an omission of a material fact by showing that the
plaintiff would have acted as he did regardless of the omitted infor158. Id. at 906.
159. Id. at 905. See also Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308,
1314-15 (2d Cir. 1974); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972);
Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see Clark v. Watchie,
513 F2d 994, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1975).
160. 406 U.S. 128.
161. See Note, Reliance in Private Actions, supra note 151, at 600. Contra, Herbst v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d at 1316 n.14; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 400 (2d Cir.) (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
162. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 410.
164. Proof of materiality coupled with a presumption of reliance proves transaction
causation. See text accompanying notes 243-46 supra.
165. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d at 906.
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mation,166 or that plaintiff had or should have had knowledge of the
67
omitted information.

Similarly, courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits have also
allowed defendants to rebut presumed reliance in rule 1Ob-5 misstatement cases falling within the open market exception.108 To
rebut the presumption in these cases, the defendant must show

either that his statements were relied upon by so few investors that
the effect of the statements on the market price of the security was

inconsequential, or that the plaintiff purchased the security "despite knowledge of the falsity of a representation, or that he would
have [purchased], had he known" of the falsity.'

The usual way to rebut the presumption in misstatement cases
prior to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'70 however, had been to assert
71

that the plaintiff did not satisfy the due diligence requirement. 1

This judicially created "defense," which is conceptually similar to
contributory negligence, aims to discourage reckless or careless investment. 7 2 It requires plaintiffs to make a reasonable investigation
of the facts surrounding the proposed transaction and to use com7
mon sense in interpreting those facts as a condition to recovery.
In Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,'7 4 the court delineated
the due diligence requirement as "the objective standard of a reasonable investor exercising due care in light of all facts" in addition

to "a duty of reasonable investigation." 7 ' In sum, the due diligence

that
requirement imposes on the plaintiff the duty "to demonstrate
0

whatever actual reliance he claims is well founded.'

7

166. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402.
167. Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1973), afJ'd, 496 F.2d
832 (3d Cir. 1974).
168. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341.
169. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d at 906.
170. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
171. See Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule lOb-5: An Implied De.
fense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 561 (1976); Note, The Due Diligence
Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule lOb-5, 1975 DuKE L.. 753 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Due Diligence]. See also Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1974);
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d at 409.
172. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).
173. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Note, Due Diligence, supra note 171, at 755-57.
174. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
175. Id. at 104. See also City Natl Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
176. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. at 1077.
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Erosion of the requirement began in Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp. 7 where the court imposed a higher standard of care
for a sophisticated investor who had purchased securities on the
basis of an inaccurate balance sheet without noticing that the balance sheet was uncertified and more than four years old. Subsequent cases have allowed recovery as long as the sophisticated
investor made a reasonable effort to gather all currently available
financial data. 8
The Supreme Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder' 7 9 portends further erosion of the due diligence defense. The
Court in Hochfelder held that proof of negligence was not sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement in a cause of action
brought under rule lOb-5;18 0 a plaintiff must show an "intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud."'' Since the development of a due
diligence requirement paralleled the relaxation of the scienter requirement' 2 the lower courts have correspondingly been quick to
spell out the implications of Hochfelder for the due diligence requirement.
In Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,l8 foreign nationals who had purchased stock in an American corporation on the strength of recommendations of an American securities broker brought an action
under rule 1Ob-5 alleging material omissions. The facts showed
that plaintiffs had satisfied Hochfelder since the defendants had
knowledge of the omissions and intent to defraud the plaintiffs by
withholding information. But, the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs should be barred from recovery because they did not
exercise due diligence before purchasing the securities.8 " In rejecting this defense the Straub court noted that the due diligence
requirement had developed in those circuits that had, prior to
Hochfelder, eased the scienter requirement in rule 1 Ob-5 cases from
177. 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
178. See, e.g., Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974).
179. 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
180. See text accompanying notes 257-302 infra.
181. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). See text accompanying notes 257-302 infra.
182. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976). As Professor
Bromberg has stated, "the price plaintiff pays for being relieved of the burden of proving
defendant's intent or actual knowledge is that plaintiff himself must show some diligence."
2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuPrrias _Aw; FRAUD, SEC Ru.L 10B-5 § 8.4, at 652 (1975). See also text
accompanying notes 257-302 infra.

183. 540 F.2d 591.
184. Id. at 596.
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intent to negligence. 18 5 Since Hochfelder restricted recovery for
omissions and misrepresentations to those showing an intent to
deceive, "the desirability of a 'contributory negligence' defense
becomes less compelling"'-8 because a defendant who makes an
"intentional" misrepresentation should not be allowed to defend
successfully by proving that plaintiff was negligent in not discovering defendant's malfeasance.
In Holdsworth v. Strong,8 7 the defendant deliberately made
false representations while purchasing securities, but attempted to
defend on the ground that plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence
in selling their stock. Because of a friendly relationship between
the parties, the plaintiffs had relied on defendant's assurances, and
had sold the stock without examining the books. In granting rescission of the sale the court pointed out that:
[i]f contributory fault of plaintiff is to cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross conduct somewhat comparable
to that of defendant.... Just as contributory negligence is not a
defense to an intentional tort case of fraud, similarly due diligence
is totally inapposite in the context of intentional conduct required
to be proved under Rule lOb-5. 8 8

There is no statutory bar in rule 1Ob-5 to this erosion of the
due diligence defense, "[n]or is there evidence that the framers of
[rule] 1Ob-5 intended due diligence to be applicable any more than
it had been applied to common law fraud."'8 s9
Nonetheless, defendants accused of actions in the wide spectrum of prohibited behavior between negligence and specific intent
to defraud 100 will still be allowed to contest liability by asserting a
due diligence defense.' 91 "Such matters as fiduciary relationship,
opportunity to detect the fraud, sophistication of the plaintiff, the
Id. at 597. See also Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100.
186. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d at 597.
187. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
188. Id. at 693-94. Professor Prosser has interpreted the common law tort issue as
follows:
[W]here there is an intent to mislead, it is dearly inconsistent with the general
rule that mere negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort.
The better reasoned cases have rejected contributory negligence as a defense applicable to intentional deceit .... "
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 716 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
185.

omitted).
189. 545 F.2d at 694.
190. See text accompanying notes 257-302 infra.
191. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. at 1078.
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existence of long standing business or personal relationships, and
access to the relevant information" will each continue to determine
the degree of diligence the plaintiff must exercise. 9 '
D.

Conclusion
Reliance is presently presumed upon a showing of the materiality of the omission in nondisclosure cases. 9 Generally, reliance
must still be proved in misstatement cases, 94 unless the misstatement affected the price of the security on the open market, in which
case reliance will be presumed upon a showing of materiality. 95
The defendant may rebut either presumption by showing that his
malfeasance did not cause the plaintiff's actions. Such a rebuttal
may be accomplished by showing that the plaintiff had knowledge
of or should have had knowledge of the manipulated data. In open
market misstatement cases plaintiff's lack of reliance might also be
shown by the fact that so few investors relied that the change in the
market price was inconsequential. 196
IV.

CAUSATION

Rule 1Ob-5 does not explicitly require a showing of causation
for a plaintiff to prevail in an action under the rule. 97 The compensatory aspect of such actions, however, does necessitate proof of
a causal nexus between a defendant's alleged violation and plaintiff's injury. 9 Justification for this requirement rests on the "in
connection with" language of rule lOb-5. 99 Although the need for
192. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d at 598.
193. See text accompanying notes 141-45 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 14648 supra.
195. See text accompanying notes 149-59 supra.
196. See text accompanying notes 160-92 supra.
197. For a general discussion of causation in common law tort, see W. PROSSER, supra
note 188, § 41, at 236. For a comparable discussion specifically concerning deceit actions
see id. § 110, at 732; 3 L. Loss, supra note 186, at 1430.
198. It simply would be unjust to require a defendant to pay a plaintiff any compensation for a violation of rule lOb-5 without a showing that defendants' violation actually
caused plaintiff's loss or injury. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney &-Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172
(2d Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969);
Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aft'd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th
Cir. 1975); 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 182, § 8.7 (1), at 213. See also Note, Reliance in Private Actions, supra note 151.
199. See note 2 supra. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said:
[]t seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed in the Act, and
the legislative history of Section 10(b) that Congress when it used the phrase "in

[Vol. 26

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

and source of the causation requirement is now well established, 200
the courts' application of the rule has been uncertain. 0 1
Courts approach the causation requirement in several ways.
Often they concentrate upon the "in connection with" language of
the rule itself and its emphasis on the proximity of the defendant's
fraud to the plaintiff's purchase or sale of a security.20

2

At times

they find the causal nexus in the materiality of the violation and in
the actual or constructive reliance of the plaintiffs.2 3 On occasion,
the courts attempt to utilize a bifurcated system of loss causation
and transaction causation.20 4 The type of evidence needed to satisfy
the causation requirement is determined by the particular approach
adopted. This section discusses some of the problems created by
these approaches and examines the development of the concept of
causation in recent rule 1Ob-5 cases.
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" intended only that the device employed ...be of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely
thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell
a corporation's securities.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
200. See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 182, § 8.7 (1), at 213-14; Note, Reliance
in PrivateActions, supra note 151, at 584-85.
201. In part, this uncertainty has resulted because many cases are terminated by
motions to dismiss based on grounds of standing and materiality and the question of
causation is never reached. See, e.g., Kerby v. Commodity Resources Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786
(D. Colo. 1975); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Another
factor responsible for the confusion is the absence of an explicit requirement of causation
in the statute and the consequent need for the development of standards for implementing
the element in case by case adjudication in several courts.
202. See Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971); Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 535 F.2d 523, 528-29 (9th
Cir. 1976); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (2d Cir. 1976); Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814-15 (2d
Cir. 1975); Golding v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 1182, 1184
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath 8, Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260,
266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1974); Landy
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365
F. Supp. 1046, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
203. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Titan
Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). See also TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85
(1970); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Hickman v. Groesbeck, 389
F. Supp. 769, 778-89 (D. Utah 1974); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
204. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974). See
also Pierre J. Lelanders & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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The "In Connection With" Requirement

Much of the development has occurred in the context of the
courts' utilization of the "in connection with" language. In 1971,
the Supreme Court decided Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. and created the "touching" standard to
determine whether the "in connection with" requirement had been
met.20 5 In that case, the Superintendent of Insurance of New York,
representing Manhattan Casualty Insurance Company, brought an
action against several defendants who participated in a scheme that
enabled one of them to purchase all of Manhattan's stock with the
company's own assets. The fraudulent scheme neither induced the
sellers to sell, nor affected the terms of the sale. Rather, it defrauded
the corporation whose stock was sold. The district court dismissed
the rule 1Ob-5 claims and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on the ground that any fraud that occurred did not
affect the sales transaction itself. °6 The Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas stated:
We agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement. But we read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar
deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face to
face....
The crux of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an
injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities
207
as an investor.

This "touching" language seemed vague and commentators argued
that it provided little practical guidance about the necessary relationship between a defendant's fraud and the purchase or sale of a
security. 208 A brief review of the subsequent application of the
standard, however, illustrates that it is not without content.
The touching standard was not met in Bolger v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath. °9 In that case, plaintiffs were lim205.

404 US. 6.

206. 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
486 F.2d 139, 154 (3d Cir. 1973).
207. 404 U.S. at 12-13.
208. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mis-

management Cases, 86 HALv. L. REv. 1007, 1013-14 (1973).
209.

381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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ited partners in an investment partnership. They brought an action
alleging that the defendant accountants prepared and disseminated
false and misleading certified annual financial statements, which
prevented them from learning of the partnership's precarious financial condition. 210 They alleged also that as a result they neither
attempted to sell their interests nor moved to prevent further deterioration of the partnership. When the irregularities were first
discovered, the plaintiffs obtained a court order dissolving the
partnership. The court viewed this dissolution as a sale of securities.211 Defendant's motion to dismiss this count succeeded because
plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement. The court held that although it appeared that there was a
scheme to defraud the limited partners, and a sale of securities in
connection therewith, the action failed because the sale (the dissolution) was not an integral part of the fraudulent scheme.2 1
Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath arose from closely related facts.218 In this case, the plaintiff, a mutual fund, alleged that the defendant accountants certified
materially false and misleading financial statements of a private
investment partnership managed by Akiyoshi Yamada, in furtherance of a scheme to induce the plaintiff to hire Yamada as one of
its portfolio managers. Plaintiffs alleged that they retained Yamada
and that the partnership suffered losses from securities transactions
which Yamada, in his capacity as investment advisor, unlawfully
210. In addition to the rule lOb-5 claim, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated section 17 (a) of the Sedurities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (a) (1970), and section 206
(1)-(2) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1)-(2). The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the section 17(a) claim and the court denied a motion to dismiss the
"Advisors Act" claim.
211. Judge Metzner noted that this provided the plaintiffs with standing:
Applying the flexible text enunciated in Vesco, the dissolution of the partnership
here clearly involved a "disposition of securities" since the limited partners were
surrendering their securities in return for what they hoped would be cash, The
fact that Takara was insolvent at this time and the limited partners did not recover any cash from the dissolution does not vitiate the nature of the transaction,
which was essentially a conversion of securities into cash.
381 F. Supp. at 266.
212. The court stated:
In order to satisfy the new "touch" test enunciated in Bankers Life, for determining if the "in connection with" requirement has been met, the securities transaction must have played some part in the overall fraudulent scheme. The plaintiffs'
sale here was not part of the defendants' overall scheme to defraud the limited
partners out of their investments.
Id. at 267.
213. 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
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caused them to make. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
after describing the "touch" test as a "broad" one, held that it was
satisfied. 14
This description of the "touch" test as a broad one might be
read to indicate that Competitive Associates requires a lesser causal
nexus than Bolger. A close reading of Competitive Associates, however, indicates that the two cases are consistent. In Competitive
Associates, plaintiff's participation in the securities transaction was
an essential part, if not the direct object, of defendant's fraudulent
scheme. In Bolger, the "sale" of the securities was merely a direct
consequence of the defendant's fraud. Thus, by 1975 the Second
Circuit gave the "touch" test form and substance to replace the
vagueness and imprecision that many believed to be inherent in
21 5
Superintendent of Insurance.
A sufficient touching occurs when
the allegedly fraudulent securities transaction is an essential part
of the overall fraudulent scheme.2 1 6 A direct relation to the fraud is
not enough when the fraud could have been effectuated without a
securities transaction.1 7
In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. and indicated that
there may be a concomitant factor that must be satisfied in order
to establish causation.21 8 In that case a reorganization trustee
brought an action on behalf of the bankrupt against its former
officers and directors. Plaintiff alleged a deceptive scheme to defraud the corporation by concealing mismanagement and the corporation's actual unstable financial condition. Plaintiff alleged that
the issuance of corporate debentures was an integral part of the
scheme because it provided the cash flow that enabled the defen214. Id. at 815.
215. 404 U.S. 6.
216. It is important to compare this development with the Supreme Court's discussion of causation in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. In that case arising under the '34 Act,
the Court noted that the requisite "causal relationship" between a defendant's violation
and a plaintiff's injury would be established if plaintiff could prove "that the proxy solidtation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 396 U.S. at 384-85.
217. The conclusion that a workable and meaningful standard has been derived from
the "touch" test of Superintendent of Insurance is important. The application of the "in
connection with" language of rule lOb-5 and the "touch" test, in the absence of a meaningful standard, could result in a federalization of state corporate law by bringing a large
portion of the scope of corporate mismanagement under rule lob-5. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 CorporateMismanagement Cases, supra note 208,
at 1013-14.
218. 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1976).
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dants to create a facade of corporate health. While plaintiff admitted that the corporation received full value for its debentures, he
asserted that the corporation was damaged because the scheme supported the continuance of a corporate waste.219
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim for failure to meet the
"in connection with" requirement, and stated that satisfaction of
the "touch" test must be determined by examining each case
in its own context to determine whether the deception or mismanagement caused injury to persons suing who bought or sold securities ....
.. [T]he "in connection with" requirement bleeds into the
requirement that the plaintiff suffer some damages. [Plaintiff] could
not successfully sue because it lost nothing in its capacity as an
investor on the issuance of its debentures. It received full value for
the securities; that the directors later frittered away the funds . . .
does not mean that [plaintiff] suffered a loss, compensable under
the federal securities fraud laws. The nexus between the securities
transaction and the alleged losses due to mismanagement is too
attenuated0 in this case to use as a predicate for Section 10(b)
liability.22
In the court's view, the essential factor in satisfying the "touch" test
was not solely whether the securities transaction was an integral
part of the overall fraud as required in Bolger and Competitive
Associates, but also whether a direct causal nexus existed between
the purchase or sale of a security and the plaintiff's losses. This
court did not erode the "touch" test adopted by the Second Circuit; it too was concerned that the securities transaction be an
integral part of the allegedly fraudulent scheme. The court did,
however, seek to make more rigorous the requirement that the
plaintiffs show an injury that is a direct result of the securities
transaction.
The application of the "in connection with" approach to
causation has not been limited to internal corporate mismanagement cases 22 Apparently, it is utilized whenever the alleged fraudulent scheme entails more than a personal choice by the plaintiff
to purchase or sell a security based upon a material misrepresenta219.

Id. at 528-29.

220. Id. at 529 (footnotes omitted).
221. See text accompanying note 207 supra. Although the court in Superintendent of
Insurance seems to disclaim the application of the federal securities laws to some internal
corporate mismanagement cases, it states that rule lOb-5 is applicable where internal deceptive practices "touch" the purchase or sale of a security. 404 U.S. at 12-13.
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tion or omission.22 For example, lawsuits that alleged violations of
section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 in "going private" transactions have
used this approach.2 3 The elimination of minority shareholders
participation in a corporation through a short form merger has
been enjoined where a valid business purpose for the merger never
existed. In such a case the use of corporate assets to purchase the
minority interests has been viewed as a fraud upon the corporation
and upon the minority "in connection with" the purchase of the
minority's interest.124 The recent Supreme Court decision in Santa
Fe v. Green, however, apparently restricts the future utilization of
rule 1Ob-5 by minority shareholders. 5 Nonetheless, the "in connection with" approach could continue as a viable method of establishing causation in "going private" transactions in which at least
some deception is alleged.2 26
B.

Causation in Fact
Although the "in connection with" approach is essential in
actions in which corporate mismanagement is alleged, a second
course is seen in rule 1Ob-5 litigation involving a plaintiff's decision
to purchase or sell securities as a result of defendant's nondisclosure
or misrepresentation. 7 If there has been a misrepresentation,
plaintiffs typically allege that they decided to participate in the
securities transaction because of the misrepresentation.2 8 If there
has been a failure to make a full disclosure, plaintiffs generally
allege that had full disclosure been made they would not have participated. In many of these cases the requisite causal nexus is met
222. A comparison of two situations is illustrative of the distinction between cases in
which the plaintiff's injury results solely from his personal decision to purchase or sell a
security and those in which the injury results from a more extensive scheme. In the former, a plaintiff may have invested in X Corporation and suffered losses after reading its
misleading prospectus which grossly overstated the assets and the prospects of the corporation. In the latter, the plaintiff may have suffered injury when the directors of Corporation
X, who also controlled Corporation Y, forced a merger between the two after artificially
deflating the market price of Y stock in order to shortchange Y stockholders.
223. See Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976) ; Green v. Santa
Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (March 23, 1977).
See also Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976); Karvelas v. Sellas, 376 F. Supp. 1010

(NJ). Ill. 1974).
224.
225.
extensive
226.
227.
228.

Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d at 1281-82.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (March 23, 1977). For a more
discussion on this point see text accompanying notes 453-80 infra.
See text accompanying notes 423-38 infra.
See note 203 supra& text accompanying note 225.
See note 137 supra & accompanying text.
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by a finding of what courts term "causation in fact." ' In making
this determination the courts do not focus on the relationship between the alleged fraudulent conduct and the economic loss sustained by the plaintiff. Rather, they stress proof of materiality and
reliance.o Plaintiff must show that the information omitted or
misrepresented was material,2ml and that he relied upon that misrepeither in fact or through a presumption
resentation or omission,
32
by operation of law
In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 2m The defen-

dants were Merrill Lynch, a prospective underwriter of a large
debenture issue, certain of its officers, directors and employees, and
several of its customers. Merrill Lynch, as underwriter, obtained
material adverse information concerning the earnings of the issuer,
Douglas Aircraft. It disclosed this information to some of its large
institutional investors (tippees). Without any further information
these customers sold their holdings in Douglas into the open market and minimized their losses, while the plaintiffs who purchased
Douglas stock during the same period sustained substantial damages. Finding that the defendant tippees' duty was not limited to
the purchasers of the shares actually sold by them, but rather that
it extended to all who purchased Douglas stock on the open market
during that period, the court proceeded to discuss causation.254
The defendants argued that their violations were not the direct
cause of the plaintiff's losses. Rather, they asserted, it was Douglas'
precarious financial condition that precipitated the sudden substantial drop in the market price of plaintiffs' holdings and caused
their losses. The court responded:
The short, and we believe conclusive, answer to defendants' assertion that their conduct did not "cause" damage to plaintiffs is
229. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 154; List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d at 463.
230. See note 203 supra.
231. Id.

232. The United States Supreme Court has stated:

Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,

positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is

that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of this decision .... This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
233. 495 F.2d 228.

234. Id. at 237.
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the "causation in fact" holding by the Supreme Court in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States ...
upon the authority of which we
conclude that the requisite element of causation in fact has been
established here by the uncontroverted facts that defendants traded
in or recommended trading in Douglas stock without disclosing
[to plaintiffs] material inside information which plaintiffs as reasonable investors might have considered important in making their
decision to purchase Douglas stock.2 5

The court realized that its holding was troublesome. Rejection of
the defendants' suggestion that it focus on the relationship between
the defendant's violation and the plaintiff's actual loss potentially
opened recovery to a large class of plaintiffs-all the investors in the
open market who traded in the issuer's shares during the period of
the violation. 6 Utilization of the "causation in fact" approach
enabled the court to avoid confronting this potentially difficult
issue because this approach presumes that the requirement of proof
of materiality and reliance effectively limits the class of plaintiffs
2 37
eligible to recover.
An approach to causation that emphasizes materiality and reliance, however, does not necessarily preclude a concomitant emphasis on the relationship between the defendant's violation and
the plaintiff's actual loss. Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., decided thirteen months after the Shapiro case, recognized this. 8
The court there stated that although an important part of the requirement of causation is materiality and reliance, the concept
might also encompass a showing that the defendant's violation was
the actual cause of plaintiff's loss.23 9
C.

Transaction Causation and Loss Causation
Two approaches to the requirement of causation in private
actions under rule 1Ob-5 have been discussed. Neither direct application of the statutory language, "in connection with," nor the
235. Id. at 238.
236. Id. at 242.

237. The required proof of materiality and reliance is sometimes seen as a check upon
overbroad extension of rule lOb-5. One court has stated that "[rlequiring reliance (and
materiality) as a prerequisite to recovery serves to restrict the potentially limitless thrust
of Rule lOb-5 to [those] situations in which there exists a causation in fact between the
act and injury." Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). As
the Shapiro case indicates, however, these requirements may not adequately serve this

function. Perhaps a requirement of a more direct proof of causation between the defen-

dant's fraud and the plaintiff's economic injury may be imposed to serve as an additional
limitation on the scope of rule lOb-5.
238. 67 F.R.D. 468.
239. Id. at 481.
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utilization of the "causation in fact" approach initially emphasized
a requirement that a plaintiff show a direct connection between the
defendant's violation and plaintiff's actual injury.2 40 Between 1974
and 1976, however, at least a few courts began to concentrate upon
this factor in their applications of the "in connection with" or
"causation in fact" approaches.241
In 1974, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. articulated a
third approach that encompassed this consideration.242 When applicable this approach requires that the plaintiff satisfy two burdens 2 43 First, it necessitates proof of transaction causation, a show-

ing that the defendant's fraud caused the securities transaction in
which the plaintiffs participated. 44 This is established by a showing
of the materiality of the violation and of the plaintiff's actual or
constructive reliance-causation in fact. 243 Second, proof of loss
causation, a showing of a direct causal connection between the defendant's violation and the plaintiff's economic loss, is explicitly
required. 246 This transaction-causation/loss-causation approach,
however, is not a comprehensive one. Its use is justified only in
cases in which plaintiff's sole allegation is that in deciding to purchase or sell his securities, he relied upon a misrepresentation or
omission made by the defendant.
Although this approach was articulated in Schlick, it was not
applied there because the case involved more than a misrepresentation or omission which affected the plaintiff's decision to purchase
or sell a security 2 47 In Schlick, plaintiffs were shareholders of Continental, a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant Penn-Dixie.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant parent artificially manipulated
240. See Competitive Assoc. Inc. v. Laventhol, Kxekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1974); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
241. Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1976);
Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
242. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974). One of the early statements of this theory appeared
in a student note in 1970. See Note, Causation And Liability in Private Actions For Proxy
Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107 (1970).
248. See 507 F.2d at 880; Note, supranote 242.
244. See 507 F.2d at 380.
245. Id. at 380-81. See also Note, supra note 242.
246. 507 F.2d at 380.
247. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "under the lOb-5 count,
proof of transaction causation is unnecessary by virtue of the allegations as to the effectuation of a scheme to defraud which includes market manipulation and a merger on prefer.

ential terms, of which the proxy omissions and misrepresentations are only one aspect."
507 F.2d at 381 (footnotes omitted).
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the market in order to cause a merger on preferential terms, with
proxy omissions and misrepresentations only one aspect of the
overall fraudulent scheme. The plaintiffs' decision to tender their
shares was important; it was, however, the existence of a scheme to
deflate the value of Continental stock that was the crux of the
plaintiffs' action and the alleged cause of their losses. Thus transaction causation, with its requirement of proof of materiality and
reliance, failed to address the essential causal relationship in Schlick
-whether the securities transaction was sufficiently proximate to
the overall fraudulent scheme.2 48 The relevant test was the "in con-

nection with" standard. 4 9 The court found that this test was satisfied,250 but also demanded that the plaintiff show loss causation
even though the transaction causation test was inapplicable.2 51
While the transaction-causation/loss-causation approach cannot be considered comprehensive, it is significant because of the
importance it places on loss causation as a separate step in a causation analysis. Moreover, Schlick is significant because it recognized
loss causation as an independent step in the analysis of a market
manipulation case in which the court initially sought a causal nexus
by using the "in connection with" requirement. Schlick made explicit the importance of loss causation as 'a separate step in both
types of causation analyses: "in connection with" and "causation
in fact."
The independent role of loss causation is significant because
in open market cases its absence creates a threat of massive liability
for a defendant by failing to restrict recovery to losses actually
caused by the defendant's violation of rule lOb-5 52 Only the application of a loss causation step prevents recovery for injuries resulting from other factors operating concurrently which might
influence the value of the plaintiff's securities. Application of this
step already has limited or prevented recovery where a defendant successfully introduced evidence that despite his violation of
248.

Id.

249. Id.; see text accompanying notes 197-208 supra.
250. The "in connection with" requirement was satisfied because the securities transaction, the merger, was an integral part of the defendant's fraudulent scheme. 507 F.2d at
381. For a discussion of the Schlick decision from an approach focusing on subsections 1
and 3 of rule lOb-5 and their relation to subsection 2, see text accompanying notes 404-13
infra.
251. 507 F.2d at 381.
252. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); Black v. Riker-Maxson Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.

(CCH)

95,270 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

the Securities Exchange Act, plaintiff's injuries resulted in whole
or in part from the plaintiff's own business mismanagement, 2 3 an
or the "host of factors which affect
abortive merger attempt, 24 255
the market price of a stock."
D.

Conclusion

The courts have struggled with the implicit element of causation in private actions for damages under rule 1Ob-5. This struggle
has produced a few recent decisions which could ideally serve as a
basis for a clear concept of causation. The touching test, as a means
to determine whether the "in connection with" requirement has
been satisfied, is practicable despite the inherent vagueness of the
term itself. Furthermore, some courts appear to be applying something akin to the loss causation standard in conjunction with both
the "in
connection with" requirement and the "causation in fact"
6
25

test.

253. See Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 527
F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975).
254. Id.
255. Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Black v. Riker-Maxson Corp., [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,270 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
256. If the decisions in these courts are indicative of a general trend, the increasing
concern with loss causation may restrict recovery to such an extent as to conflict with the
purpose behind section 10 (b) and rule lob-5 which is "to protect the investing public and
to secure fair dealing in the securities markets." 495 F.2d at 235. A further indication of
this possible trend may have been evidenced in the most recent Supreme Court case concerning the application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926 (1977), the Court, reversing the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit which had awarded damages to Chris-Craft, held that a tender
offeror did not have standing to sue for damages under section 14 (e) in its capacity as
take-over bidder. Justice Blackmun concurred with the result but based his determination
not on plaintiffs lack of standing but on Chris-Craft's failure to establish the requisite
element of causation. Emphasizing what we have called loss causation, he stated:
In the case of suit by a tender offeror to recover damages suffered as a result of
securities law violations by its competitors, causation is a far more complex issue.
It is not enough for the offeror to prove that the competitor's violations caused
the shareholders of the target corporation to act in a certain way. In addition, the
offeror must show that the shareholders' reactions to the misstatements or omissions caused the injury for which it demands remuneration. Even though the
Mills-Affiliated Ute Citizens presumption satisfies the requirements for proof of
the first element of causation, the absence of any evidence that the violations
might have altered the outcome of the contest for control would leave me unable
to hold that the securities law violations caused the disappointed contestant's
ultimate injury-its failure to acquire control of the target corporation.
97 S.Ct. at 954 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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SCIENTER

There has been a great deal of discussion about the necessity
of plaintiff's proving scienter in order to prevail in a cause of action
arising under rule 1Ob-5.257 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 58 the
Supreme Court attempted to resolve the matter by holding that
proof of scienter is required.2 9 This section will examine the extent to which the Court achieved its purpose. The methods employed in this examination will be two-fold: (1) the Court's opinion
will be analyzed to determine its cogency; (2) the most interesting
district court cases since the Hochfelder decision will be interpreted
and categorized. Behind this two-pronged approach lies the conviction that a judicial opinion without cogency either will distort
the development of the law and encourage well-meaning deviousness on the part of the lower courts or will have little lasting effect.
A. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
Since neither section 10(b) nor rule 1Ob-5 explicitly states
that scienter is a necessary element of a rule 1Ob-5 cause of action,
some justification for imposing such a requirement must be advanced. Three basic avenues to such justification exist: policy,
analogy, and statutory interpretation 2 60 To reach its decision in
257. See, e.g., Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Goldwasser, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: An Anti-Landmark Decision, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
29 (1976); Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of Culpability Necessary for Violation
of the Federal Securities Laws in Information Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
571 (1975).
258. 425 U.S. 185.
259. Id. at 194-214.
260. A policy analysis would proceed by noting the lack of specificity in the statute
and by discussing the consequences that a decision for or against scienter would have for
the regulation of securities transactions. After evaluating these consequences in the light
of the supposed purposes of regulation, the decision most in accord with those purposes
would be made. An analogical approach would capitalize on the similarities between securities fraud as defined by section 10 (b) and the common law tort of misrepresentation.
See, e.g., Bucklo, supra note 257; Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32
Bus. LAw 147 (1976). Although this approach is often helpful when no other techniques
are available, its use presupposes that the application of traditional analytical categories
makes sense in the particular historical context (the development of highly organized
securities markets) and in connection with a statute which is detailed enough to establish
its own frame of reference.
A reading of studies on the tort of misrepresentation, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note
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Hochfelder, the Supreme Court relied almost entirely on statutory
interpretation. 26 ' The Court divides its interpretation into two
main parts: the first part concerns itself with the language, narrowly defined, of section 10(b); the second evaluates the legislative
history of section 10(b) with the aim of fitting the statutory language into the general scheme of the Securities Act of 1933262 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 . s In an attempt to determine
the import of Hochfelder,these two parts will be discussed in order.
The discussion will lead to the following claim: the style of the
Court's argumentation and its refusal to decide on the relation of
recklessness to scienter combine to render the import and impact
of Hochfelder uncertain.
The Court reasons that the broad language of section 10(b)
must be read as literally as possible because other sections of the
188, §§ 105-110, at 683--736; Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583 (1958), suggests the following kind of reasoning: The doctrines of
common law fraud presumably had their origins in the attempt to deal with isolated,
relatively unsystematic efforts to deprive persons of their property under false pretensesunsystematic in the sense that the background of the fraud was to a large extent created
by the individual defrauders themselves. Modem securities fraud, on the other hand, takes
advantage of a large network of background interrelations-such as quick, mass communication, organized securities analysis, large-scale division of responsibility-the existence of
which buyers and sellers have come to assume. This network involves a large number of
different kinds of actors lawyers, accountants, securities analysts, broker-dealers), each of
which is accustomed to playing a particular role. Apparently innocent actions, when played
against this background, can achieve fraudulent effects which are nearly impossible in an
"isolated" scheme. It makes little sense to expect that the standards of proof that apply in
cases of isolated fraud will apply to cases of systemic fraud as well. In particular, the kind
of dramatic creativity necessary for isolated fraud need not be present in the systemic
variety. Without such creativity the older notions make less sense, and the burden of
proof may become impossible to carry.
The third approach, labeled "statutory interpretation," attempts to find or develop
categories (or elements of the particular cause of action) which appear most appropriate
in terms of the actual language of the statute as a whole. None of the three approaches
can be found in its pure form in any but the least problematical judicial opinions-if
there. Nevertheless, it does not seem pointless to isolate them for purposes of discussion.
An interesting example of analogical interpretation mixed with the other methods
under discussion can be found in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (an injunction action):
Absent any clear indication of a legislative intention to require a showing of
specific fraudulent intent .. .the securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law both to effectuate the broad remedial design of Congress . . .and to insure uniformity of enforcement. . . . Moreover, a review of
other sections of the Act from which Rule lOb-5 seems to have been drawn suggests that the implementation of a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence as well as active fraud comports with the administrative and the legislative
purposes underlying the Rule.
401 F.2d at 855 (footnotes omitted).
261. As defined in note 260 supra.
262. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
263. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7Shh-I (1970).
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'33 and '34 Acts are fairly precise in their reckoning of blameworthiness. By itself, this is a non sequitur; since the Court's
justification for this position is contained primarily in its discussion of the legislative history, further consideration of this matter
will be postponed. In attempting to derive a strict interpretation
of the statutory language, the Court concentrates on the words
manipulative, deceptive, device, and contrivance. As evidence for
the claim that these words "strongly suggest . . . knowing or intentional misconduct, ' 214 the Court cites a dictionary which was
compiled and appeared at the time the '33 and '34 Acts were
passed.2 15 In support of its dictionary citations the Court suggests
that manipulative "is and was virtually a term of art when used in
connection with securities markets."' 66 Presumably terms of art
have no rough edges.
How convincing is the Court's reading of the statutory language? One way to decide is to replace the study of out-of-context
dictionary definitions with the analysis of the relevant words as
used in sentences. Not only is the latter method employed in modern philosophy and linguistics;2 67 it would appear to be implicit in
any theory of legal interpretation 2 68 If the use of a word in a particular sentence or class of sentences appears inappropriate-and
all possible disturbing variables are eliminated-it can be concluded
that the range of meaning borne by the word is in conflict with the
range of meaning borne by the remainder of the sentence. The
opposite conclusion can be drawn if the use of the word in certain
classes of sentences appears appropriate.2 69 In a thorough analysis,
a long sequence of such tests of word meaning would eventually
provide the data for a semantic analysis. Here we need only be
concerned with certain obvious aspects of the meaning of the
words in question.
Note first that it would be acceptable to say of someone that
he "manipulated our opinions by saying nothing," since by saying
nothing one can create a false impression of the true range of facts.
264. 425 U.S. at 197.
265. Id. at 199 n.20. The reference is to WusrEa's INTEmATIONAL DICTIONARY
ed. 1934).
266. 425 U.S. at 199.

(2d

267. See J. KArz, SEmANTIC THEoRY (1972); L. WrrrENSMIN, PmLOSOPmAL INVES-TGATIONS (1953).
268. See, e.g., 1 K. ZWEiGERT & H. K6Tz, EINIJFHRUNG IN DIE REMnsERGLEICrUNG AU'
DEm GEBETE DES PmvATREctrrs, 92-106, 311-28 (1971).

269.

See J. KATz,supra note 267.
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Saying of someone that "his actions were deceptive" need connote
nothing more than the claim that his actions conveyed a false impression of the situation. Although the example using manipulate
still suggests intentionality even in the absence of action, the example using deceptive does not. At least it does not appear to entail
the necessity of any intent. Since manipulative and deceptive are
joined in the statute by an or, it follows that the non-intentional
reading is not excluded. Device and contrivance may be analyzed
in a similar manner, leading to the conclusion that contrivance is
the "more intentional" of the two words. It can be said, for example, that someone attained his goal "by the contrivance of remaining quiet in crucial situations." All that need be meant by such a
statement is that the person in question decided, for whatever
reason, to remain silent. Similarly: "By the device of remaining
quiet, he totally escaped our attention, even though he really only
wanted to lower the noise level." Since device and contrivance are
joined by an or, only one of them need be read together with one
of the pair manipulative/deceptive to produce a statutorily effective description of a forbidden act. Thus, one of the acts prohibited
is the use of a deceptive device, another is the use of a manipulative
contrivance. If the above semantic analysis is accepted, it means
very little to say that someone "use[d] or employ[ed]" a "deceptive
device." 2' 70 The species of intent involved in a deceptive device

could be said to resemble so-called general, as opposed to specific,
intent in that "general intent" often refers to little more than voluntary activity 27 ' There exists no identity between this sort of intent and fraudulent intent as defined in Hochfelder; in evidentiary
terms, there is little distinction between the kind of intent implied
by deceptive device and the kind of mental activity accompanying
negligence. The Court's attempt to justify a scienter requirement
by employing only a dictionary-oriented form of statutory interpretation thus fails. 72
270.

15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).

271. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scoaw, JR., HANDBOOK ON CIMINAL LAW 201-02 (1972).
272. In this regard, it should be asked what the Court meant when it said that "[i]n
certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for

purposes of imposing liability for some act" but that "[w]e need not address here the
question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability
under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5." 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. Presumably the Court believed that
its definition of scienter might not cover recklessness, although it is possible that the Court
only meant to say that common law principles of adjudication require caution in deciding
issues not directly presented by the case. Reasoning from the statutory language, however,
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The crux of the Court's discussion of the legislative history of
section 10(b) and related provisions in the '33 and '34 Acts is found
in the following statement: "In each instance that Congress created express civil liability in favor of purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether recovery was to be premised on
knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent
mistake." 273 From this premise, the Court reasoned: (1) there is
nothing in section 10(b) that spells out liability for negligent behavior;274 (2) congressional reports use examples which are appropriately described as implying scienter; 75 (3) therefore, Congress
intended to require scienter. Unfortunately, the premise upon
which the Court relied7 6 also supports the opposite conclusion. If
section 10(b) contains nothing explicitly allowing actions based on
negligence, neither does it explicitly exclude such grounds-nor
does it speak precisely to the issue of scienter. Thus, if one wants
to argue from the precision of other sections of the '33 and '34
Acts, one must conclude that section 10(b) occupies a middle
ground. Little, if anything can be deduced from the purely verbal
relation between section 10(b) and its statutory context. If verbal
context is of little help, the principal remaining aids to interpretation are policy arguments and pieces of legislative history.
There are three difficulties inherent in the use of legislative
history in this case: (1) there is little of it;277 (2) unless the legislative reports are directly on point and the point is crucial, it is not
likely that remarks made forty years earlier will be particularly
relevant to the problems which have arisen in the interim; (3) what
history exists is ambiguous. The last point is most worthy of development here. Congressional commentary on gross cases of wellplanned manipulation means nothing more than that these abuses
compels the conclusion that at least recklessness and perhaps everything but strict liability
is covered by section 10 (b), as was shown in the text accompanying this footnote. To exclude recklessness in a future case, the Court would have to go beyond the narrow language
of section 10 (b) and admit into its opinion some reasoning about the purposes of that
section, something it was unwilling to do in Hochfelder except indirectly in its discussion
of legislative history. But a willingness on the part of the Court to employ more explicit
reasoning about purpose in any future case of this sort would render its failure to do so
in Hochlfelder equivalent to a claim that the problems of interpretation raised by section
10 (b) are relatively easy (i.e., look it up in the dictionary). The long history of litigation
under rule lOb-5 belies such a claim.
273. 425 U.S. at 207.
274. See id. at 207-10.
275. See id. at 201-06.
276. See text accompanying note 273 supra.
277. See, e.g., 425 U.S. at 201-02.
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were viewed as paradigmatic examples of what needed correction
at the time the legislation was enacted. Unless one is willing to
subscribe to the view that language once used remains fixed in its
implications for all time, nothing conclusive can be deduced from
the examples alone. What must be argued is the extent to which
the framework established by the statutory language and the legislative examples could and should be extended to accommodate
newly arisen situations. Although such analysis necessarily involves
perceptive understanding of language and analogical reasoning,
it
270
usually appears in the guise of arguments about policy.
The only explicit discussion of policy in Hochfelder is contained in a footnote at the end of the majority opinion. There the
Court said that "[a]cceptance of respondents' view [that negligence
should be a sufficient basis for liability in actions brought under
rule 1Ob-5] would extend to new frontiers the 'hazards' of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious policy questions
not yet addressed by Congress. "280 The Court did not argue for its
view that Congress, and not the SEC, should make this policy decision; nor did it adduce evidence to support the implication that
if respondents' view were adopted all mistakes would be actionable
or have a settlement value (not all mistakes by doctors are actionable). In addition, the Court failed to give a reason for the implicit
supposition that a weakening of the scienter requirements alone,
with no change in the other elements of a rule 1Ob-5 cause of action,
would have as great an effect as a weakening of a scienter requirement which was the only element of a cause of action.2 8'
278. If the lawgiver of a small kingdom is confronted with a crass case of fraud and
decides: "I will henceforth punish all deceptive activity," it would seem perfectly legitimate for a later lawgiver to reason: "Although the first lawgiver employed general language while dealing with a specific case, I am not restricted to sanctioning only such cases
as have heretofore been recognized. The first lawgiver simply realized the basic relationship between his case and all other cases in which people had been deprived of the property in some intuitively unjust way. I am free to apply his rule to the much more subtle
problems which have arisen since the beginning of writing, because the response must be
as subtle as the threat."

279. See Williams, The Opacity of Real Conspiracies,in PROCEEDINGS
SoctErY 406 (1976).

OF THE SECOND

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERKELEY LINGUISrICS

280. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
281. Hoclfelder could in this respect be interpreted as affecting the scienter requirement in the same way that Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
affected the purchaser-seller requirement: namely, as part of a continuing attempt to
limit private causes of action. The limitation of judge-created private rights of action is,
however, not per se inimical to justice. Nevertheless, such limitations should receive cogent
justification.
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B. Post-Hochfelder Decisions
If the Supreme Court's opinion is as diffuse and inconclusive
as has been argued above, how could and how have the lower
courts reacted to it? Beyond merely requiring an allegation of
scienter, something which was unfortunately lacking in Hochfelder,282 the lower courts could ignore the imprecision and require a
narrowly defined version of scienter; they could stumble along in
the imprecision of the Supreme Court's reasoning; or they could
exploit the imprecision to subvert Hochfelder. The last possibility
is suggested by the opinion in McLean v. Alexander,2sa in which
the court deliberately invited attenuated reasoning leading toward
an inference of scienter: "Apart from the three Circuits which
nominally at least had accepted a negligence standard, the remaining Circuits, [sic] have simply required some form of scienter but
none have rejected any one degree of scienter as insufficient in private damage actions. ' 284 Although the facts in this case clearly
suggested recklessness, 2 5 thus possibly qualifying it for the extension left open in Hochfelder, s6 the court's apparent willingness to
countenance attenuated inferences could signal a significant method
of circumventing the Hochfelder restrictions. How significant becomes clear in another passage of the opinion:
Under common law principles, liability is likewise established when
the plaintiff is an unidentified member of a group or class and the
defendant has the purpose of influencing any of the members of
the class even if the defendant makes the misrepresentations
gratuitously without any personal interest in the outcome.287
282. 425 US. at 190 n.5.
283. 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
284. Id. at 1081 (footnotes omitted).
285. See id. at 1080. The court appears to have recognized as much:
[W]ith the barest of information and misinformation, he certified the receivables
as 'considered fully collectible.' Whatever the terminology may express to the professional accountant regarding the absence of a bad debt reserve, the investing
public, however sophisticated, may reasonably infer that the use of this language
presumes some hard knowledge that accounts receivable both exist and will be
paid. One can only conclude that Schiavi assumed the accounts represented sales,
assumed they were on a bill and hold procedure and assumed that the customers
were credit-worthy. To designate an account 'considered fully collectible' on the

basis of assumptions without requesting proper documentation or verification
from management is no more than reckless disregard for the truth.
Id. at 1084-85.
286. See note 272 supra 8,accompanying text.
287. 420 F. Supp. at 1085.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

The court's willingness to accept tenuous inferences is supported
by the very nature of the reasoning which must be employed to
establish a mental element in any cause of action. From the statement that someone knows or intends X it does not logically follow
that he knows or intends Y, even if X and Y are closely related to
one another, either by deduction or in the real world. Although an
external observer would be quite willing to testify as to the closeness of the relation, and many others might be willing to agree
with him, it still does not follow that our someone really knows or
intends anything in connection with this relation. This is so even
if we were of the opinion that no normal human being could lack
such knowledge or intent. We would either have to conclude that
our someone is not normal or take a practical approach and claim
that the chances that the knowledge or intent exist are good, despite
what our someone might protest. Courts take both approaches;
much of the reasoning displayed in judicial opinions dealing with
the law of conspiracy or attempt can be construed as an effort to
find forms of practical reasoning which can be employed to overcome this problem of general non-deduceability, which is often
referred to in logical studies as "referential opacity. '

288

The prac-

tical reasoning utilized in the effort to infer mental states from
circumstantial evidence is potentially more important than any
precise distinction between recklessness, negligence and scienter. 219
If enough courts agree that certain behavior (in a particular context) justifies an inference of scienter, however defined, then Hochfelder can be circumvented. Cases in at least partial accord with
McLean v. Alexander include Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills,
20 1
Inc.2 9 ° and Carr v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.

Miller v. Schweickart22 notes that "[a] fact-finder may draw
reasonable inferences from known or proven facts, but the inference
must be based on common experience and be logical and reasonable. 29 3 Although this principle appears similar to that employed
by the court in Alexander, the Schweickart court reached more
conservative solutions, as the reference to "common experience"
might lead one to expect. In supporting its finding that scienter
288. See generally Williams, supra note 279.
289. Id. See also Keeton, supra note 260.
290. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REPa. (CCII)

291. 414 F. Supp. 1292 (ND. Cal. 1976).
292. 413 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
293. Id. at 1065.

95,683 (ED. Tenn. 1976).

RULE lOb-5

1977]

was not present, the court wrote: "Accepting the fact that repurchase agreements are usually written, this does not stamp oral
agreements as unusual or illicit. Whether written or oral, the subject matter of the parties' agreement and their respective obligations are the same. 2'

94

In a related case, Kaback v. Schweickart &

Go.,29 5

the same court again evaluated the evidence conservatively.
Plaintiff claimed that Schweickart had both misrepresented its financial condition and omitted references to a string of monthly
losses. In holding that intent to defraud had not been proven, the
court relied on the following facts: Schweickart had invested his
own money (as well as that of others) in the firm, thus showing that
he had confidence in the firm's prospects; self-enrichment was not
a motive; plaintiff never requested financial statements; plaintiff
was concerned only with receiving interest on the loan in question,
and plaintiff had in fact
regardless of the monthly profits or losses;
29
received the interest until bankruptcy. 1
In Entin v. Barg297 the court decided that a certain stipulation
of settlement was not unreasonable, given "the difficult task of
proving that a large accounting firm acted willfully."2 98 Use of the
word willfully in this context indicates that the court favored imposing a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff; this in turn suggests a reluctance on the part of this court to turn the imprecision
of Hochfelder to plaintiff's advantage. A similar reluctance on the
part of the same court is found in Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman:
[W]e hold that to establish the element of scienter in an action
brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, a party must prove
injury resulting from a conscious deception or from misrepresentation so recklessly made that the culpability attaching to such reckless conduct closely approximates that which attaches to conscious

deception.2 09

The holding in Carrollv. Bear, Stearns & Co. is of like import. 00
294.
295.
296.
tributory
297.
298.
299.
Pa. 1976).
300.

Id. at 1066.
415 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 650. Note how the arguments which appear to go to reliance and connegligence were mingled with a finding about scienter.
412 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
95,764, at 90.'62 (E.D.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RE'. (CCI-)
416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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The clustering of relatively strict holdings in the Southern
District of New York, in conjunction with varied opinions in the
Third Circuit (Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Delaware) and
lax opinions in California, suggests that lower court decisions will
pattern roughly as they did before Hochfelder.3°1 If this pattern
holds during the next few years, the Supreme Court will have done
little more than change the style in which rule 1Ob-5 opinions are
written. If more than style is to change, the Court will probably
have to go beyond the techniques of interpretation which it applied
in Hochfelder. This will require discussion of policy and under30 2
lying rationale.
VI.

RELIEF

The anti-fraud sections of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934303 contain no specific remedies for civil liability. Since first
301. For the Ninth Circuit, which contains the Northern District of California, see
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); for the Second Circuit, containing the
Southern District of New York, see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. at 1082, perceived the situation in its Circuit, the
Third, as fluid and cites several cases in support of its claim.
302. The implications of Hochfelder for a number of relatively peripheral issues
remain unclear. There is no direct indication of whether the Supreme Court intended its
ruling to apply to any subsections of rule lOb-5 other than subsection 2. The Court did,
hovever, cite subsection 3 in the course of its argument, 425 U.S. at 212, and the basic
rationale of its holding-a development of the implications of the language in section
10 (b)-would suggest that Hochfelder applies to rule lob-5 in its entirety. The applicability of Hochjelder to SEC requests for injunctions is slightly less clear. Some subsequent
lower court cases have held that the rationale of Hochfelder is broad enough to require
the SEC to prove scienter. See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). Other courts, however, have continued to allow the use of a negligence
standard in an action for injunctive relief, arguing that the purpose of such an action is
sufficiently different from that of an action for damages as to preclude the application of
Hochfelder. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,751 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geotek, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,756 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The fact that Hochfelder explicitly
restricts itself to actions for damages supports the latter holdings. 425 U.S. at 187-88. The
reconciliation of Hochfelder's logic with the general policy of injunctive actions would be
difficult, if not impossible. Note that Vacca v. Intra Mgmt. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), extends Hochfelder to actions for rescission.
303. Section 9 (a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (a) (2) (1970), prohibits trading on an exchange
to raise or depress the price of securities for the purpose of inducing purchase or sale of
such securities. Section 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970), and rule lob-5 promulgated there.
under, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), prohibit fraud by any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. Section 14 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (e) (1970), prohibits fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with tender offers. Rule 14a-9,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977), promulgated under section 14 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1970),
prohibits false and misleading statements in proxy materials.
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recognizing implied private rights of action under rule 1Ob-5, 3°
the courts have had to fashion appropriate measures of damages
without clear statutory mandate. In doing so, the courts have found
guidance in section 28(a) of the '34 Act 0 3 which states, in pertinent
part, that the "remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any . . . that may exist at common law or in equity . . .
[and] . . . no person . . . shall recover . . . a total amount in
excess of his actual damages." 3 0 Unfortunately, section 28(a) provides little practical guidance to a court seeking to determine an
award appropriate to a specific case.30 7 The only general rule that
can be derived from section 28(a) is that the "actual damages" language prohibits an award of punitive damages. °8 Although the
above excerpt suggests that the courts may adapt the common law
fraud remedies of rescission,3 0 9 damages for breach of warranty,3 10
and damages for deceit,311 in cases of securities fraud these remedies have proved to be inadequate responses to the complex and
ingenious methods that have been devised to defraud investors
since the enactment of the '34 Act. It is difficult to generalize about
rule 1Ob-5 damages from the case law as it has developed so far
because relatively few 1 Ob-5 cases actually reach the issue of dam304. Kardon v. National Gypsum, Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (a) (1970) [hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, all references to
section 28 (a) are to that section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].
806. Id.
307. Some courts argue that section 28 (a) refers only to actions expressly created by
the Act and not to implied remedies. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 288 F. Supp.
417, 444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
The legislative history offers nothing additional, the relevant passage reading, "[t]his subsection reserves rights and remedies existing outside of those provided in the act, but
limits the total amount recoverable to the amount of actual damages." H.R. REP. No.
1383, supra note 90, at 28.
308. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968). See also deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). For a similar result in a '33 Act case which
looks to the '34 Act for policy guidance, see Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418
F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under
the Federal Securities Acts, 47 NoTmE DAmE LAw. 72 (1971); Kroll, Some Reflections on
Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of Barchris and
Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681 (1969). Note, however, that punitive damages may be recovered
if federal and state claims are joined using the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, and the
state law allows for the recovery of punitive damages. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d
1040, 1044-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329,
1337-88 (10th Cir. 1972).
309. For a discussion of these remedies in relation to damages under the '33 Act see
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 231 (1934).
310. Id.at228.
311. Id. at 283-42.
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ages, 12 and those that do often result in damage awards tailored
3 13
closely to the facts of each case.
A.

31 4

Rescission

A defrauded plaintiff may obtain rescission in a suit brought
under rule 1Ob-5; that is, he may recover the securities if he is a
seller, or he may receive the purchase price of the securities if a
buyer, after tendering whatever he received in the transaction. 13
There are, however, numerous reasons why it may be inappropriate to seek rescission as a remedy. Because rescission is an equitable
remedy, it may be denied if plaintiff is guilty of laches, 810 or if the
court determines that plaintiff waived his right to rescission 17 or
should be estopped from asserting it.31 8 In addition, the securities
may be unavailable for a variety of reasons,1 9 or the plaintiff may
have sold the securities into the open market. 20
B.

Damages
Whether or not rescission is available, plaintiff may also sue

312. 3 A. BRoMBEmG, supra note 182, § 9.1, at 225; Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages
in 10b-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAw. 1839 (1976); Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule 10b.5, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rxv. 733, 736 (1971). Often, once a case survives defendant's motion to dismiss,
it is settled. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 136, 1792-93.
313. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner g- Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241-42
(2d Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
314. Rescission is a remedy in an action for restitution; it restores the buyer to his
financial position prior to the sale. The Securities Act of 1933 explicitly provides rescission
as a remedy. Section 12 (1)-(2) of the '38 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1)-(2) (1970), specifies rescission for violations of section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Section 11 (e) of the '33 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1970), allows plaintiffs to recover a rescission measure of damages if defendants file materially defective registration statements. For a discussion of the problems
created by the overlapping of the '33 Act and the protection afforded under rule lob-5
see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751-60 (1975); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
315. See, e.g., Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1976) (sellers' omissions and
president's misrepresentation concerning corporation's future prospects warranted rescission); Bowman & Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Mass.), all'd, 417 F.2d
780 (1st Cir. 1969).
316. Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037
(1970).
317. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
818. Id.
319. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
(corporation merged out of existence); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (defendant resold stock); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135
F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (corporation liquidated).
320. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d at 95-96, 105.
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for damages . 21 The "actual damages" limitation of section 28(a)
of the '34 Act has consistently been interpreted in rule lOb-5 cases
to mean an "out-of-pocket" measure of damagesU 2 "Out-of-pocket"
damages provide recovery of the difference between the actual
value of what the injured party gave and what he received.3 23 If
the plaintiff is a defrauded buyer, the court will award the difference between the purchase price of the stock and "the price at
which [the buyer] would have purchased the stock in an unmanipulated market. ' 324 Any dividends or other payouts received from
the defendant reduce the buyer's damage award. 23 If the plaintiff
is a defrauded seller, "out-of-pocket" damages are the difference
between the sale price and "what [the seller] would have received
3 26
had there been no fraudulent conduct."
In cases brought by a seller, typically the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to sell securities that he later learned were worth
more than the price he received for them.327 In addition to allowing rescission3 28 or awarding "out-of-pocket" damages3 29 the courts
may require defendants to return windfall profits received as a
321. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., CASES & MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION
1086 (4th ed. 1977); 3 L. Loss, supra note 136, at 1793.
822. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971). The "out-of-pocket"
measure of damages is used in the common law action of deceit. See 3 L. Loss, supra
note 136, at 1629.
323. See Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1037
(1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969);
3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 182, § 9.1. at 226-27; Note, Measurement of Damages in Private
Actions Under Rule 10-b5, 1968 WAS. U.L.Q. 165, 172. For a discussion of other types
of damages theories which have been used from time to time see generally Comment

Securities Law-Damages for Violation of Section 41(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,26 BUFFALO L. REv. 119
124-29 (1976-77).
324. Sarlie v. E.L. Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp. 371, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 239-40.
325. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d at 44 n.13; Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d at
105; see Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 744-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
326. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
The "out-of-pocket" measure is not intended to be speculative in nature; it seeks to
determine what the plaintiff lost rather than what he might have gained. See Estate
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533
(10th Cir. 1962). The "out-of-pocket" measure should be contrasted with the "loss-of-thebargain" measure used in common law breach of warranty actions, which would award
the difference between the actual price and the represented value of the securities. See 3
L. Loss, supra note 136, at 1628; W. PROssER, supra note 188, § 110, at 734. This measure
of damages was explicitly rejected for lOb-5 litigation by the Second Circuit in Levine v.
Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971).
327. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
328. See text accompanying notes 314-20 supra.
329. See text accompanying notes 322-26 supra.
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result of defrauding the sellers. 3 In a case where it is appropriate,
plaintiff seller will recover the difference between the sale price
and the actual value at date of sale plus any profits that the defendant may have obtained. Disgorgement of profits thus increases the
plaintiff's award. In Janigan v. Taylor 3 1 the court noted, "it is
more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit of windfalls than to let the defrauding party keep them. . . . [I]t is simple
equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment. '' 332 A plaintiff's recovery is limited, however, to the amount
of the profit not attributed to the defendant's own efforts to in333
crease the value of the securities after the fraud.
In cases involving corporations with actively traded stock,
"out-of-pocket" damages are subject to another important modification. Damages will be calculated based on the value of the securities at a "reasonable" period of time after plaintiff discovered the
fraud. 4 Under this "cover award" rule, the defendant is not liable
for any change in value of the securities after the time when the
reasonable investor, knowing of the fraud, would have acted to protect himself.333 If plaintiff elects not to replace/repurchase the securities after discovery of the fraud it is deemed a second investment
decision,33 6 and he assumes the risk of any further changes in market value.
The "out-of-pocket" measure of damages13 7 is also the starting
330. The Supreme Court approved of this disgorgement of profits theory in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 156. See also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309
(2d Cir. 1974); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified on
other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). Disgorgement of profits has also been referred
to as the "constructive trust approach" by at least one commentator. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra
note 182, § 9.1, at 227.
331. 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
332. 3,14 F.2d at 786.
333. Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1975).
334. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d at 105-06; see Note, The Measure
of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. Rnv.
371, 378 (1974).
335. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d at 105. In Mitchell, the plaintiffs
were not in privity with defendants. Defendants were company officers and employees who
withheld information indicating that the company had discovered valuable mineral deposits on land it owned in Canada, causing plaintiffs to sell into the open market without
knowledge of these strikes. Defendants violated rule lOb-5 by making material misstatements in press releases and by trading on inside information. The court applied a measure
of damages designed "to award the reasonable investor the amount it would have taken
him to [re]invest in the TGS market within a reasonable period of time after he became
informed" of the true facts. Id. at 105.
336. Id.
337. See text accompanying notes 322-26 supra.
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point for calculating the damage award in cases brought by defrauded purchasers. 338 To determine what the buyer lost, the "out-

of-pocket" measure requires calculation of the difference between
the actual value of the securities and the price paid for them. The
actual value of securities at the time of purchase, however, is sometimes difficult to determine with certainty. Market value, capitalization of earnings techniques, and book value of assets are recognized as factors to be considered, 339 but there is often no market in
the securities, no earnings history, or a problem in valuing intangible assets. 340 In addition to the difficulties inherent in calculating

the actual value of securities at the date of purchase, this calculation
may well be inaccurate:
The extent of the difference between the actual value of the securities and the purchase price will not necessarily be fully known
until some time after the original transaction. This follows because
the same fraudulent practices that induced the plaintiffs' purchase
of the securities also operate on other buyers thereby affecting the
prevailing market price. It is not until the existence of the fraudulent conduct is known that the true value of the securities as an
investment can be ascertained: Accordingly, the actual extent of
the loss sustained may be ascertained as of the date the purchaser
realizes, or should realize, that he has been defrauded. It is at this
date, when the purchaser discovers the fraud, that he is first in a

position to seek redress either through a rescission of the contract,
or in an action for damages. 341
Following this reasoning, courts generally value securities as
of a date subsequent to the date of purchase.3 2 Some courts look to
the date the plaintiff actually discovered, or should have discovered,
the fraud, 48 although others refer to the date when the general
338. See 6 L. Loss, supra note 136, at 3922-23 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Cobine, Elements
of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972 U. IaL. L.F. 651, 673; Note,
The Measurement of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities,
26 STA.N. L. Ray. 371, 384 (1974).
339. See Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968
WAsH. U.L.Q. 165, 173-74.
340. See Note, The Measurement of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 384 (1974).
341. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d at 104 (footnotes omitted).
342. Once a date subsequent to sale is used for calculating damages, the result no
longer strictly follows the "out-of-pocket" measure, which looks at price and value at the
same time (date of purchase). The courts, however, refer to this measure alternatively as
"rescissory" or "out-of-pocket."
343. See Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d at 43-44; Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 379
F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D. I1. 1974).
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public both knew of the fraud and revalued the security to account
34
for it.
Some of the assumptions supporting the use of a date subsequent to purchase for evaluating damages have been questioned.
This approach assumes that there is only one class of reasonable
investors, each member of which will react simultaneously, when
in fact there may be several classes, each with a different degree of
sophistication and, therefore, a different "reasonable" reaction
time. 5 In addition, any measure that determines damages on the
basis of some date subsequent to sale assumes that the decline in
the price of the stock after the purchase date results solely from
the fraud, although in reality there could be numerous other causes,
among them a generally declining market. 46
Behind these theories which tend to limit a plaintiff's recovery
seems to be a concern for the effect large recoveries could have on
innocent stockholders of defendant corporations, a class of investors
also protected by the securities laws. 4T A large award to plaintiffs
could bankrupt not only guilty defendants, but also their corporation and its innocent stockholders.
Courts do not always seek to limit purchasers' damages, however. Recently, some courts have recognized the possibility of
awarding consequential damages34 to defrauded purchasers in addition to "out-of-pocket" or rescissory damages.8 49 Discussion of
these "consequential" damages usually occurs, however, in the context of remanding the cases to a lower court, and no court has actu344. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976); 6 L. Loss, supra note 136, at 3922 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). This is particularly sensible for class actions, and is the position of the drafters of the AL.I. Federal
Securities Code. See A.L.I. FEDERAL SEcuRrriEs CODE § 1402(f)(1)(A) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
345. Short term and long term investors, for example, watch the markets with a different degree of care and might be expected to react to changes in significantly different
ways. See Note, The Measurement of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities,26 STANJ. L. R~v. 371, 379-80 (1974).
346. For a discussion of how sophisticated regression analysis techniques could be
applied to determine more accurately how much of the decline is due to fraud and how
much is due to other factors, see id. at 385-97.
347. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.Co., 446 F.2d at 105.
348. Consequential damages are those which are the result of special or incidental
circumstances. See W. PROssER, supra note 188, § 110, at 735.
349. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Dumlite Co.,
Inc., 524 F.2d at 589; Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.
1975); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-40 (7th Cir. 1974); Ohio Drill & Tool
Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 190-91 (6th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Co., 476
F.2d 795, 801-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
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ally made an award of "consequential" damages to a purchaser in
a rule 1Ob-5 case. Presumably, such cases are settled.
The "consequential" damages mentioned are of two distinct
types. Several courts have said that defendants who generate profits
through the use of fraudulently acquired assets may be required to
disgorge them.3

50

The consequential damages discussed in these

cases are similar to the disgorgement of profits found in actions
brought by sellers, 35' but in other cases, they go still further35 and
2
approach tort and contract consequential damages in scope.

If

adopted into lOb-5 damages law, the disgorgement-of-profits type
of consequential damages would make buyers' remedies symmetrical with sellers' remedies. Awarding damages patterned after tort
and contract consequential damages, on the other hand, adds a new
type of relief for defrauded purchasers.
The possibility of allowing consequential damages for defrauded buyers was first discussed in Zeller v. Bogue ElectricManufacturing Corp.,3 where the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in reversing and remanding a lower court summary judgment for defendant, commented upon the possible damages suffered
by the plaintiff. In Zeller the defendant corporation incorporated
a subsidiary and caused it to make a public offering of a quarter of
its outstanding stock. The subsidiary prospered and the defendant
parent corporation induced the subsidiary to advance a series of
interest-free loans to it. Plaintiff brought a derivative action on
behalf of the subsidiary, claiming fraud in the loan transactions.35 4

Because the loans were ultimately repaid with eight percent interest, the district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of section
28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, stating that the plaintiffs suffered no "actual damages." Plaintiff appealed claiming that defendant parent corporation realized a profit by not having to pay a
higher rate of interest in the open money market, and that the
subsidiary was damaged by being deprived of the money to invest
350. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d at 589; Ohio Drill & Tool Co., Inc. v. Johnson,
498 F.2d at 190-91.
351. See text accompanying notes 330-33 supra.
352. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(1)(b) & comment d (rent. Draft
No. 11, 1965); C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 122, at 459-60 (1935);
W. PROSSER, supranote 188, § 110, at 735.
353. 476 F.2d 795, 802-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 908 (1973).
354. The court held that this transaction, an involuntary purchase of securities,
satisfied the purchaser-seller requirement of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953).
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in its own operations which would allegedly have generated more
than an eight percent profit. Further, the interest-free loans were
alleged to be a factor in aborting a second public offering of the
subsidiary's stock which would have raised more working capital
and, consequently, more potential profits.
The court of appeals first considered the question of whether
the "disgorgement of profits" rationale of Janigan v. Taylor,"
Myzel v. Fields,3 " and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States'"
should be applied when the defrauded party is a buyer, as well as
when he is a seller. It concluded that "[t]he reason why the remedy
has been applied for the benefit of defrauded sellers but not of
buyers is not any decisive legal difference but the difficulty generally confronting the defrauded buyer in showing that the fraudulent seller has in fact reaped such a profit."' 85s The opinion further
states that "it seems appropriate to require the seller to disgorge
any profits he would not otherwise have been in a position to realize if these can be traced with sufficient certainty."' '5 The subsidiary, it reasoned, might be able to prove that the parent corporation
realized a profit by not having to borrow the money at a higher
rate of interest in the open money market. 60
The court next considered the converse of the first question:
by lending the money elsewhere or by using the money in its own
operations, could the subsidiary have realized more than the eight
percent it actually received on the loans? In addition, the alleged
losses suffered because of the cancellation of the second public
offering were considered. Such losses, it should be pointed out, do
not relate to windfall profits that the defendant made. Rather, they
are traditional consequential damages.361 Noting that consequential
damages increase what would ordinarily constitute a fair recovery, 62 the court said "[w]e perceive no sound reason for refusing
to apply this principle under the Securities Exchange Act."'0 3 Having made new law, the court then placed a heavy burden of proof
355.
44 F.2d 781, 786-87 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
356. 386 F.2d 718, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
357. 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972).
358. 476 F.2d at 802.
359. Id. at 802 n.10.
360.

Id. at 802.

361. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965);
C. MCCORMICK,supra note 352, § 122, at 459-60 (1935).
362. 476 F.2d at 803.
363. Id.
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on the plaintiff: "[W]e do not wish to arouse unfounded expectations in Zeller or in other potential 1Ob-5 plaintiffs. A plaintiff
seeking consequential damages for fraud, at common law or under
federal securities legislation, must establish the causal nexus with
a good deal of certainty. "364
Several circuits have cited Zeller for the proposition that "consequential damages" are a possible remedy for defrauded purchasers. '05 Still, it is unclear whether these courts are adopting the two
types of damages discussed in Zeller. For example, in Thomas v.
Duralite Co., Inc.,36 6 the court cited Zeller only for the proposition
that "if the defendant made profits through the use of assets which
he had fraudulently acquired, he should not be permitted to keep
them.18 7 On the other hand, in Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman,,'8 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that plaintiffs
might be able to recover, as consequential damages, expenses they
incurred trying to prevent the bankruptcy of a company whose
shares they were fraudulently induced to purchase.3 69 These are
clearly tort and contract consequential damages. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seemed to refer to both
types of damages when, citing Zeller and the second restatement of
the law of torts, it said "federal courts have increasingly recognized
the buyer's right to consequential damages where it can be proven
with reasonable certainty that such damages were caused by the defendant's 1Ob-5 violations." 370 It remains to be seen how widely the
idea will be accepted, and how successful plaintiffs will be in3 71proving their consequential damages with "sufficient certainty.
C.

Conclusion
The law of damages for rule 1Ob-5 is still in a formative
stage.3 72 The courts have the flexibility to fashion remedies corre364. Id. The "causal nexus" must be between the consequential damages and the defendant's fraud. In a footnote, Judge Friendly suggested still another refinement: "We
would see nothing wrong in a principle varying the required degree of certainty somewhat
inversely with the depth of the fraud." 476 F.2d at 803 n.11.
365. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d at 909; Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d at
589; Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d at 1071; Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman,
498 F.2d at 238-40; Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d at 190-91.
366. 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975).
367. Id. at 589.
368. 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974).
369. Id. at 238-40.
370. Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d at 1071.
371. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d at 802 n.10.
372. R. JENNINGS & H. MlutsH, JR., supra note 321, at 1085.
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sponding to the needs of particular fact situations. If rescission is
not practicable 373 the "out-of-pocket" rule374 is generally recognized
as the starting point for the calculation of damages, but it is subject
to a number of modifications. Depending on the facts surrounding
the fraud, the court will select an appropriate date for valuing the
securities; the "out-of-pocket" loss is the difference between the
value on that date and the value of whatever the plaintiff relinquished or received. In addition courts may make adjustments
to the "out-of-pocket" calculation by utilizing disgorgement-ofprofits, 37 cover award 3 7 6 or consequential damages 377 theories. Because the fact situations in rule 1Ob-5 cases are so diverse, covering
both large and small corporations, as well as numerous varieties of
fraud in both the purchase and sale of securities, the courts need
flexibility in applying remedies. Creatively applied, the theories
discussed above provide that flexibility.

VII. SUBSECTIONS 1 AND 3 OF RULE 10B-5: IMPLIED
NULLIFICATION BY THE SUPREME COURT IN SANTA FE V. GREEN?

Most rule 10b-5 cases have been decided under the authority
of subsection 2 which forbids the misrepresentation of or failure to
disclose a material fact.3 7 8 Subsections I and 3 differ from subsection
2 in that they contain no reference to deception, either misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Subsection 2 forbids, for example, "any
untrue statement," while subsection 1 forbids any "practice . . .
which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person."' 370 The

rare judicial reliance on rule 1Ob-5(l) and (3) may be attributed in
part to the difficulty of articulating principles that would prevent
these subsections from preempting major portions of state corpo373. See text accompanying notes 314-20 supra.
374. See text accompanying notes 321-27 supra.
375. See text accompanying notes 330-33 supra.
376.
377.

See text accompanying notes 334-36 supra.
See text accompanying notes 348-71 supra.

378. Although the rule's subdivisions are printed in the Code of Federal Regulations
as "a," "b," and "c," see note 2 supra, both courts and commentators often refer to them
as "1," "'2," and "3," respectively. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151-52 (1972); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1286-87, 1290 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977); 1 A. BROMBERO, supra note 182, q 1.4, at 11-12.
379. See note 2 supra.
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ration law. 3 0 Subsection 2, by contrast, avoids some preemption
problems by its apparent allusion to the common law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. 8 ' That tort differs from (and thus distinguishes) state laws of corporate fiduciaries in its requirement that
the plaintiff prove deception.
It has been argued that subsections 1 and 3 impliedly require
deceit. 2 This construction has two drawbacks: it ignores the plain
wording of the subsections, 38 3 and it unnecessarily strips them of
any effect independent of subsection 2. It is therefore more plausi84
ble to interpret rule 1Ob-5(2) as referring to common law fraud
and rule lOb-5(1) and (3) as referring to equitable fraud.8 5 In SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau8 6 the Supreme Court traced the
distinction between the two theories of fraud while interpreting
8s7
the anti-fraud provision of the 1940 Investment Advisor's Act.
The Court quoted Hanbury's Modern Equity, saying, "law has
come to regard fraud . . . as primarily a tort, and hedged about
with stringent requirements, . . . while equity regarded it as a

conveniently comprehensive word for the expression of a lapse
380. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Moore, J., dissenting), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977). State law has been the traditional source

of the imposition of fiduciary duties upon corporate managers and directors. These duties
are generally classified into two types: (1) the duty to exercise care in the management of
the corporation, and (2) the duty of loyalty to the corporation. See generally W. CARY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATONS 445, 469 (4th ed. abr. 1970). Violations of the duty

of loyalty are regularly redressed in rule lOb-5 cases when the plaintiff proves deceit in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. See cases cited in notes 405 & 411 infra.
381. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d at 97; Schlick v. PennDixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d at 378 n.8.
382. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d at 1301-04 (Moore, J., dissenting);
accord, University Capital Corp. v. Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., [19 74 -19 75] FED. Sac. L. RaP.
(CCH) 94,949, at 97,274 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1975).
883. First, it is difficult to explain away the lack of specific reference to misrepresentation in subsections 1 and 3, or their failure to refer to subsection 2 if in fact they were
intended to incorporate portions of that subsection. Second, subsection 3 prohibits any
"practice which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit" (emphasis added). If "fraud" is construed as always containing an element of deceit, then "fraud" in rule lOb-5 (3) is rendered
without effect; "deceit" encompasses all fraud, and more.
384. "The gravamen of fraud is deceit and there cannot be fraud where a party is
not deceived." Studer v. Bleistein, 115 N.Y. 316, 324, 22 N.E. 243 (1889).
385. This type of fraud has been referred to as "new fraud" in the context of rule
lob-5 cases. E.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972); Jacobs, The Role of
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CoRNELL L. REv.27, 57 (1973); Note, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands
Federal CorporateLaw, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1103 (1969).

386. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
387.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
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from the high standard of conscientiousness [required by a] fiduciary relationship. 3888 The Court acknowledged the need for
breadth in defining equitable fraud, citing an 18th century letter:
Fraud is infinite, and were a Court of Equity once to lay down
rules, how far they would go, and no farther, in extending their
relief against it, or to define strictly the species of evidence of it,
the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new
schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive.380
It is submitted that the federal courts have, in relying almost
exclusively on subsection 2 of rule 1Ob-5, "define[d] strictly the
species of evidence" of fraud, requiring proof of deceit through
either nondisclosure or misrepresentation; and that, as a result, the
"fertility of men's invention" has contrived several fraudulent
schemes which have eluded the jurisdiction of the courts.10 The
patent unfairness of these schemes caused some courts to abandon
their reliance on subsection 2 and to seek authority for wider remedial powers in the equitable fraud subsections. 01
A.

The Use of Subsections 1 and 3 to Amplify Subsection 2
Cases relying on the broad language of subsections 1 and 3
are of two types: those which seek authority to expand the scope of
the deceit theory of subsection 2,892 and those which impose a federal liability for corporate mismanagement, 38 either with notions
of "constructive deceit" ' or equitable fraud.8 05
The Supreme Court has used IOb-5(1) and (3)only to supplement subsection 2. One such case, Superintendent of Insurance,31
involved a theft only tangentially involving the sale of a security.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a dismissal
388. 375 U.S. at 193 (citing H. HANBERRY, MODERN EQUITY 643 (8th ed. 1962)).
389. 375 U.S. at 193 n.41 (citing letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord James (June 30,
1759), reprinted in J. PARKES, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 508 (1828), quoted in

496 (25th ed. 1960)).
390. E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, No. 76-1289 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 1977) (involving a
merger); Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) (going public); Kaufman v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (going private).
391. See notes 396-449 infra & accompanying text.
392. See notes 396-413 infra &accompanying text.
393. See notes 414-49 infra &accompanying text.
394. See notes 414-22 infra &accompanying text.
395. See notes 423-49 infra & accompanying text.
396. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). For an elaboration of the facts of the case, see text accompanying notes 205-08 supra.
E. SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
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' for lack of a fraud "in connection with the purchase
of the case 97
or sale of any security. 3 8 The Supreme Court reversed, relying
apparently on rule lOb-5(3): the Court found the defendants'
scheme to be an "act or practice" that operated as "a fraud or deceit." 99 Dictum in the opinion supports the theory that rule lOb5(3) does, in fact, forbid a breach of fiduciary duty without any
requirement of proof of deceit. "The Congress made it clear that
'disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web' along with manipulation, investor's ignorance, and the like." 400 The facts of Superintendent of Insurance,however, do not suffer from any lack of proof
of deception. Thus, the case cannot fairly be read as dispensing with
the requirement of deception to prove a rule lob-5 violation.
The Court used subsection 3 to support its finding that the
"in connection with" requirement had been satisfied, rather than
to establish a new theory of liability under rule IOb-5. 401 Curiously,
the Court used the broad language of rule lOb-5(3) to modify the
"in connection with" clause even though the purpose of that clause
is to qualify all three subsections. 4 2 This suggests that the Court
did not appreciate the import of subsection 3, but used it as a
4°3
means to an end that it would have reached in any event.
The Second Circuit has also used rule lOb-5(3) to modify an
element of the rule lOb-5(2) claim. In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Ce397. 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), af'g 800 F. Supp. 1083 (SJ).N.Y. 1969).
398. See text accompanying notes 205-06 supra.
399. 404 U.S. at 9.
400. Id. at 11-12 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1883,supra note 90, at 6).
401. 404 U.S. at 9-10. The case was disposed of as a deception case, however. "The
crux of the present case is that plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices .... Id. at 12.
402. See note 2 supra.
408. Expansion of the scope of rule lOb-5 has occurred without recourse to subsections 1 or 3.E.g., SEC v. Great Amer. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (seller of
real estate who, in exchange, receives securities is liable for misrepresentation under rule
10b-5); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967)
(shareholder forced to sell shares because of merger need not show reliance).
The Court also relied on the language of subsection 3 in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). There the Court dealt with the problem of proving
reliance in a nondisclosure case, and specifically noted that subsections 1 and 3 do not
require any "untrue statement of a material fact" or "omission to state a material fact,"
id. at 153, yet ultimately disposed of the case as a nondisclosure deceit case. Noting the
broad language of rule lob-5 (1) and (3), the Court eliminated the reliance element from a
rule lOb-5 cause of action based on nondisclosure.
While other Supreme Court cases have referred to subsections 1 and 3, none have
come closer than Affiliated Ute to applying equitable fraud principles. See, eg., Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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ment Corp. °4 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim under rule 1Ob-5 concluding that the plaintiff had
alleged nothing more than unfair merger terms without alleging
the fraud or deception "with specificity. 40 5 The court of appeals
reversed, treated the suit as a nondisclosure case and relied, in part,
on the broad language of subsections 1 and 3 to change the causation element of the rule 1Ob-5(2) cause of action. The court distinguished subsections 1 and 3 from subsection 2: "The SEC Rule
does refer to common law fraud . . . in subsection 2, but it also

illegalizes, in subsection 1, employing any 'device, scheme or artifice to defraud' and, in subsection 3, engaging 'in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person.' "406 The court clearly relied on subsection
3 to relieve the plaintiff of pleading a specific deception. The opinion is unclear, 0 T however, about whether this distinction is the
basis of its other rule 1Ob-5 holding: that transaction causation 08
need not be shown in certain nondisclosure cases.4 0 The court

seems to require proof of violations of both subsection 2 and subsection 1 or 3 before it will dispense with transaction causation. 410
Superintendent of Insurance and Schlick both relied on rule
1Ob-5(3) to justify a lessening of the proof requirements for a claim
based upon rule lOb-5(2), yet they can be read as endorsing the
theory of a rule 1Ob-5 claim based solely upon a breach of fiduciary
duty.411 They are weak authority for such a theory, however, be,
cause each case clearly involved deceit 412 and both opinions ana404.
405.

507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
94,163 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). FED. R.
[1973] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CC)

Civ.

P. 9 (b)

requires specificity in complaints alleging fraud.
406. 507 F.2d at 378 n.8.

407. Schlick's discussion of why transaction causation need not be shown can be read
as applying the principle of Affiliated Ute by equating reliance with transaction causation.
507 F.2d at 380-81. The same discussion can be read as applying equitable fraud principles
to rule lOb-5. "Under the lOb-5 count, proof of transaction causation is unnecessary by
virtue of the allegation as to the effectuation of a scheme to defraud which includes market manipulation and a merger on preferential terms." Id. at 881.
408. See note 242 and text accompanying notes 244-45 supra.
409. 507 F.2d at 380-81.
410. "Proof of transaction causation is unnecessary by virtue of the allegations ...
of a scheme to defraud . . . of which . . . misrepresentations are only one aspect." 507
F.2d at 381.
411. One commentator perceives both cases as essentially involving equitable fraud.
See Note, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.: Fraudulent Mismanagement Independent
of Misrepresentationor Nondisclosure Violates Rule 10b-5, 63 CALIF. L. RaV. 563, 568, 57178 (1975).
412. Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. 6 (1971), involved a complicated scheme
intended to give the impression that the defendant had $5 million that he did not have
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lyzed the
claim primarily as a rule 1Ob-5(2) nondisclosure com413
plaint.
B. The Application of Subsections I and 3 in Corporate
Mismanagement Cases
1. Constructive deceit. Although the courts have frequently
said that rule 1Ob-5 does not forbid "mere internal mismanage41
ment,1 414 mismanagement "touching""

a fraudulent securities

transaction is actionable under rule 1Ob-5.416 While the courts usually require proof of deception as an element of the transaction
complained of, rule 1Ob-5(2) frequently has been applied without
such proof in cases involving insider self-dealing. 417 A typical suit
involves a corporate scheme to defraud minority shareholders which
has been approved by at least some fully informed directors. If the
corporate action does not require shareholder approval there need
not be any communication with the shareholders, and thus no need
to deceive them. In such instances the courts have usually found
"constructive deceit," holding that the corporation can be deceived
even though the officers and directors, those making the corporate
decision, are fully informed.418
In Shell v. Hensley,419 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained the theory of constructive deceit by saying that the
self-dealing of insiders strips the corporation of the opportunity to
become fully informed, preventing it from "taking advantage of
the safeguards the disclosure requirements of the rule were meant
Schlick was decided as a nondisclosure case involving misleading proxy statements. Compare the frank proxy statement quoted in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277,
1279 (2d Cir. 1976).
The only other Supreme Court decision resting on rule 10b-5 (3), Affiliated Ute, discussed in note 403, supra, involved, among other deceptions, affidavits that misrepresented
the consideration given in exchange for securities.
413. See notes 401 8: 407 supra. See also note 403 supra.
414. See, e.g., Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. at 12 (1971); Travis v. Anthas
Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 527 (8th Cir. 1973).
415. See notes 205-17 supra & accompanying text.
416. See generally Jacobs, supra note 385.
417. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1969); Dasho v. Susquehannah Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Ruckle v. Roto
Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
418. Most constructive deceit cases hold that a corporation can be deceived although
all of its decision makers are fully informed. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th
Cir. 1970). Cases holding that at least one officer or director must be deceived, e.g., O'Neill
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), have been largely ignored on this point. See generally Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement
Cases, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1007, 1020-31 (1973).
419. 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
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to provide. '420 The court also explained its holding in terms simi-

lar to those used in equitable fraud cases, however, saying that the
self-dealing prevented the corporation from engaging in "securities
transactions in a 'climate of fair dealing.' ",421 Nonetheless, the court
analyzed the complaint before it in terms of rule 1Ob-5(2) deception, merely foregoing the requirement of proof of nondisclosure
or misrepresentation.422
2. Equitable Fraud. The Second Circuit opinion in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook42 3 rests on alternate holdings: the constructive
deception of the corporation 424 and equitable fraud. The court
there defined equitable fraud as "a violation of Rule lOb-5, subdivision (3)[absent any allegation of deception] because [the defendant] engaged in an 'act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud.' "425 One judge dissented from
this decision because of the breadth of its implications: "[T]he
result is to transform a simple cause of action against directors for
' 420
waste . . . into a federal securities fraud case by judicial fiat.
The Second Circuit later retreated from the equitable fraud
theory in Popkin v. Bishop.4 7 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
a proposed merger was to be consummated at an unfair exchange
ratio,428 but he failed to allege any colorable deception. The trial
420. Id. at 827.
421. Id. (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 201).
422. 430 F.2d at 827. This passage from Shell reflects a fundamental ambiguity found
in most corporate mismanagement cases: while they are doctrinally bottomed on rule
lOb-5 (2) deceit, they are philosophically linked to equitable fraud. A similar ambiguity
can be found in a line of cases finding "deception" in the failure to disclose the fraud
which is the basis of the complaint. Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d
1326 (7th Cir. 1969) (failure to disclose a breach of fiduciary duty); Vine v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 374 F.2d 627 (failure to disclose an intent to freeze out minority shareholders); Levine
v. Biddle Sawyer Co., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (undervaluation of shares in corporation freezing out minority shareholders held a misrepresentation); accord, Bailes v.
Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971) (failure to disclose issuance of watered
stock).
423. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
424. "Aquitaine and the directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders .... 405 F.2d at 220.
425. 405 F.2d at 219-20. This holding was analyzed in equitable fraud terms in
Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandize.
ment, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 VA. L. Rrv.
755, 806-07 (1970); Jacobs, supra note 385, at 57-60; Patrick, Rule lOb-5 Equitable Fraud
and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 21 AL. L. REv. 457 (1969); Comment, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103
(1969).
426. 405 F.2d at 220 (Medina, J., dissenting).
427. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
428. Some corporate mergers are consummated by an exchange of the shares of the
surviving corporation for all the outstanding shares of the corporation that is being
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court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The appeals court rejected appellant's argument that Schoenbaum
had eliminated the deceit element in rule 1Ob-5 cases. The Popkin
opinion ignored Schoenbaum's equitable fraud holding, analyzing
only its constructive deceit holding.4 29 In doing so, the court concluded that Schoenbaum's "emphasis on improper self-dealing did
not eliminate non-disclosure as a key issue in Rule 1Ob-5 cases. 430
In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the appeals court pointed to
the existence of an adequate remedy at state law,431 although the
adequacy, if not the existence, of such a remedy has been strongly
questioned. 2
The Popkin decision, severely criticized by most commentators,438 was eroded by two recent cases in the Second Circuit. In
merged into the survivor. The rate of exchange between the two companies' shares is
called the exchange ratio.
429. The Popkin opinion stressed Judge Hays' conclusion that the defendants in
Schoenbaum "'were guilty of deceiving the stockholders .....
464 F.2d at 719 (quoting
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d at 220).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 720.
432. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1021-26 (1975);
Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv.
297, 304-07 (1974); O'Neal & Jenke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or
Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 327 (1975); Patrick,
supra note 425, at 458-60; Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HIv. L. REv. 1189, 1200-17 (1964); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. Rxv. 1630, 1634-40 (1961). See generally Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
There are five principal criticisms of the appraisal remedy. (1) The minority loses the
opportunity to benefit from the improvements in the corporation's business, including the
value intrinsic in any forthcoming merger. (2) The minority has no access to corporate
data which might rebut the corporation's appraisal of the shares. (3) The cost of litigating
the appraisal of shares is often prohibitive. (4) Appraisal statutes allow the corporation to
select the timing of the appraisal, resulting in lower valuation. (5) The minority may
suffer adverse tax consequences caused by unplanned realization of income.
Pophin, involving a Delaware corporation, cited Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952), as providing injunctive relief for aggrieved shareholders undergoing a "freeze-out." While Sterling does require that "interested mergers"
be "fair," this decision has been highly qualified. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717
(Del. 1971) (plaintiff must prove that defendant is guilty of fraud before defendant must
carry the burden of showing fairness of the transaction). See also David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 36 (Del. Ch. 1971); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192
(Del. Ch. 1971).
New York courts have construed the short-form merger statute as denying equitable
relief to minority shareholders. Bloomenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115
N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952). There may be reason to think that corporations must now
show a valid business purpose for the merger. See People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83
Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
433. See, e.g., Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases, 86 H. v. L. REv. 1007, 1040-46 (1973). But see Comment, Securities
Law Rule lOb-5-Second Circuit Holds Rule 10b-5 Inapplicable to Corporate Mismanage-
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Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 43 4 the directors of the defendant
corporation ordered a short-form merger 435 of a subsidiary corpora-

tion. Under Delaware law, under which the subsidiary had been
incorporated, shareholder approval was not necessary to consum-

mate the merger.4 36 The plaintiff minority shareholders of the subsidiary alleged gross undervaluation of the subsidiary's shares and
failure to disclose the merger until after its completion.
The court did not discuss the adequacy of the proof of constructive deceit raised by the nondisclosure alleged in the complaint.4 37 Instead, the court decided the case on the basis of
equitable fraud, relying on rule 1Ob-5(3).
While the "fraud" at which lOb-5 is aimed obviously includes ...
misrepresentation and nondisclosure . . .it is by no means limited
to that type of illegality. "Fraud includes all acts . . . which in-

volve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence ...
and are injurious to another. . .

."

When controlling shareholders

of a publicly held corporation use corporate funds to force extinction of the minority shareholders' interest for the sole purpose
of feeding [their] pocketbooks . . .such conduct goes beyond mere

negligent mismanagement and is properly cognizable as "an act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
438
...
a fraud.
The Green court distinguished Popkin to avoid overruling it.
In Popkin, the appeals court distinguished corporate transactions
requiring shareholder approval, such as the merger then before it,
from those not requiring such approval.43 9 The Popkin court mainment When Full Disclosure Is Made to All Shareholders-Popkin v. Bishop, 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1229 (1972).
434. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
435. A short-form merger is one in which a shareholder owning nearly all of the stock
in a corporation is authorized by state law to merge the corporation into another under
terms denying the minority any right to participate in the ownership of the corporation.
No shareholder ratification is necessary. The degree of ownership necessary to qualify for
this privilege varies from state to state, usually running in the range of 90-95%. For a
list of states allowing short-form mergers and the percentage of ownership necessary to
execute such a merger, see 533 F.2d at 1299 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting).
436. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 258 (1953 & Supp. 1971-1972).
437. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated rule lOb-5 by their "failure
to disclose the merger to the plaintiffs until after its completion." 533 F.2d at 1288. This
alleged nondisclosure is no more far-fetched than other theories accepted by the federal
courts. See cases cited in notes 417 & 422 supra. In Levine v. Biddle Sawyer, undervaluation of shares in a freeze-out was held to constitute a deception in a rule lOb-5 case. This
theory would have allowed the Green court to uphold the plaintiff's complaint without
resort to equitable fraud.
438. 533 F.2d at 1290.
439. 464 F.2d at 719.
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tained that constructive deceit was an appropriate doctrine only
in the latter type of transaction. 440 The Green court was thus able
to distinguish Popkin by noting that it was faced with a transaction
not requiring shareholder approval. Yet Green's holding made no
use of the constructive deceit doctrine: rather than eliminate the
element of deceit in a rule 1 Ob-5(2) analysis, the court developed
an independent rule 1Ob-5(3) theory of liability. The Green court
said that an allegation of substantial undervaluation of a minority
shareholder's shares and a lack of a justifiable business purpose441
440. The Second Circuit in Green stated that "Popkin holds that the primary reason
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure was required was that shareholder approval was
necessary. . . . Whether full disclosure has been made [in this case] is not the crucial inquiry since it is the merger and the undervaluation which constitute the fraud . . . ." 533
F.2d at 1291-92. The factual distinction between Popkin and Green hinges on the difference between long-form mergers (those requiring shareholder approval, as in Popkin) and
short-form mergers (Green). Neither Green nor Popkin states a persuasive reason why
either constructive deceit or equitable fraud should apply only to transactions not requiring shareholder approval.
441. The business purpose test expressed by the Second Circuit in Green and Marshel,
while novel to rule lOb-5 litigation, see, e.g., Tanzer Economic Assoc. v. Haynie, 388 F.
Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), is not unique in federal law. The federal courts have used the
same test in deciding whether to permit a petition for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Zeitinger v.
Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1917) (holding that a petition
presented for the sole purpose of squeezing out a minority shareholder must be denied);
Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1955). Equitable fraud principles in the field
of freeze-out mergers, see note 447 infra, may therefore be supported as simply denying
an alternative means of accomplishing that which is forbidden under the bankruptcy laws.
See Marshel, 533 F.2d at 1280.
State courts have often applied the business purpose test to corporate transactions.
Although the test was originally intended as a means of placing the burden of proof on
the directors of the corporation to show that their actions were in good faith, e.g., People
v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d
787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975); Outwater v. PSC, 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (Ch. 1928),
this has not always been the case. Some courts have acknowledged the business purpose
test, yet required the plaintiffs to show fraud or bad faith before applying the test. E.g.,
Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 241 N.Y. 427, 150 N.E. 505 (1926); accord, Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) ("inherent fairness" test). State courts have applied the
business purpose test to minority freeze-outs in Concord Fabrics, Tanzer, and Outwater as
well as to other actions by controlling shareholders oppressive to the minority. Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d
487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975). The business purpose test has been combined
on occasion with a requirement that the directors show that the alleged business purpose
cannot be achieved by alternate means. Id. Valid business purposes have been found where
a stock option plan would increase employee loyalty, McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d
388 (2d Cir. 1958), and where a merger would result in increased efficiency through synergistic integration of the merged corporations. See, e.g., Merrit v. Libby, McNeil & Libby,
533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976) (request for injunction alleging violation of rule lOb-5 denied
after Green and Marshel); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. 1976).
The assessment of the validity of an alleged business purpose is, of course, highly
discretionary, and subject to potentially conflicting interpretations. It has been argued, for
example, that a going private transaction, see note 447 infra, is in itself a valid business
objective, Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987,
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for a short-form merger is sufficient to state a cause of action under
rule 1Ob-5(3). 44
One week before the Green decision the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit decided Marshelv. AFW Fabric Corp.,443 which
involved a long-form merger requiring shareholder approval.444 In
transactions requiring such approval, Popkin, as construed by
Green, interprets rule 1Ob-5 as requiring only full disclosure. Although the plaintiff in Marshel conceded that full and accurate
disclosure had been made and alleged only gross unfairness in the
merger, the Marshel court nevertheless applied equitable fraud
principles to this transaction. The court distinguished Popkin by
saying that its principle (requiring an allegation of deception in
transactions requiring shareholder approval) applies only in cases
in which the plaintiff alleges only an unfair exchange ratio in a
merger.445 If the plaintiff alleges something more, such as impropriety of the merger transaction itself, Popkin does not apply and
deceit need not be alleged to state a cause of action under rule
1Ob-5(3). 446
The Marshel court articulated a standard of liability for rule
1Ob-5 equitable fraud actions involving a freeze-out44 7 merger
1006-18 (1974), and that it is usually inimicable to a valid business purpose. Brudney, A
Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. Rav. 1019, 1050-55 (1975); Note, Going Private, 84
YALE L.J. 903, 919-28 (1975).
Although the business purpose test has only been applied in rule 10b-5 cases to going
private transactions, it could become incorporated generally into rule lOb-5 (3) equitable
fraud theory if, as some commentators argue, rule lOb-5 equitable fraud has been applied
under the constructive deceit doctrine to the full spectrum of self-dealing mismanagement
cases. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 385, at 57-61, 75-109.
442. The court in Green also included as an element of a post-merger complaint
based upon equitable fraud failure of the defendants to notify the minority shareholders
that the merger was contemplated. The court implied that upon receipt of such notice
injunctive relief will be available to the shareholders. Thus this element is a form of
laches: the plaintiff must seek an injunction rather than waiting for consummation of the
merger and seeking monetary relief.
The Green opinion alluded to a better basis for distinguishing Popkin, but did not
rely on it, seemingly because the Popkin opinion reasoned differently. The merger in
Popkin was ordered in a prior court judgment, thus presenting the corporation with a
compelling reason for the merger. This would establish a "business purpose" as required
by Green.
443. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
444. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. Lmw §§ 901-911 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1976-1977).
445. 533 F.2d at 1282.
446. Id.
447. "Freeze-out" is a term used to describe a merger the terms of which prescribe
that the minority shareholder is denied the opportunity of continued ownership in the
corporation.
Most rule lob-5 freeze-out merger complaints occur in the context of "going private"
transactions. "Going private" refers to corporate actions that reduce the number of share-

1977]

RULE 10b-5

whereby the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant, a person
participating in the control of the corporation, 448 used corporate
funds; (2) that the expenditure was beneficial to the majority
shareholders; (3) that the transaction eliminated minority shareholders; and (4) that the transaction was of no benefit to the corporation.4 9 Marshel extended the holding of Green in two ways: it
applied equitable fraud principles to corporate actions that require
shareholder ratification, and it included controlling shareholders,
as well as officers and directors within the class of potential defendants in equitable fraud actions.
Some decisions of other circuit courts can be interpreted as
involving rule lOb-5 equitable fraud.0 ° Only the Second and
holders to less than 300, thus allowing the company to discontinue its obligation to file
statements with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4) (1970) (section 12(g)(4) of the '34 Act).
For an analysis of the Green and Marshel opinions in terms of "going private" regulation,
see Note, Federal"Going Private" Standards: A New Direction for the Second Circuit?, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 427 (1976). See generally Borden, supra note 441; Brudney, A Note on
Going Private, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by
Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAw. 699 (1975); O'Neal & Jenke, supra note 432;
Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices,Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141 (1975); Sommer, Going Private: A Lesson in
80,010 (Nov. 11, 1974);
Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975] FEn. SEC. L. RaE'. (CCH)
Note, Recent Developments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REv. 1252 (1973); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
448. This refers to the "controlling influence" standard of Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at
219. See generally, Note The ControllingInfluence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAav. L. REv. 1007 (1973).
449. Unlike Popkin, both Green and Marshel recognized the equitable fraud alternative of Schoenbaum. In Marshel, for example, the court stated that "[i]n Schoenbaum, it
exercised a controlling influence
was alleged that . . . the controlling shareholder ...
over the issuance to it . . . of treasury stock for wholly inadequate compensation. This
court held that, if established, the transaction constituted a violation of rule lOb-5." 533
F.2d at 1281. Similarly, the Green court stated, "[i]n Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook . . . we
focused on the question whether improper self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty by the
majority, without more, constituted a violation of lob-5. Answering that question in the
affirmative, [the court] emphasized subdivision (3) of Rule lOb-5." 533 F.2d at 1290.
450. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a trial court's adoption of
equitable fraud in Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g 343 F.
Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972). In that case a corporation attempted to execute a merger into
a shell to squeeze out the minority shareholder. The majority shareholders, contemplating
going public, anticipated an increase in the value of the corporation's shares. They were
thus using the corporate funds for their personal benefit, augmenting their position in the
corporation. As in Marshel, the rule lob-5 complaint in Bryan contained no allegation of
deception, only abuse of corporate power. The Court of Appeals, though it discussed subsection 3 of rule lOb-5, chose to refrain from establishing a precedent and decided against
the defendants on the basis of state law. Although it suspended judgement on the propriety
of applying equitable fraud to rule lob-5 claims, the court's sympathetic treatment of the
principle has resulted in an interpretation that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
supports the equitable fraud of rule lob-5. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533
F.2d at 1298-99; Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d at 1280. See generally Kessler,
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Eighth -51Circuits and a handful of district courts, 5 2 however, had

explicitly adopted the theory prior to Green's reversal.
C. Santa Fe v. Green: The Demise of Rule lOb-5 Equitable
Fraud
1. The Decision. On March 23, 1977 the Supreme Court
overruled Green v. Santa Fe and the court of appeals' inclusion of
equitable fraud within rule lOb-5(l) and (3). In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,4 0 the Court disregarded the wording of the
rule, and based its analysis on the wording of the enabling statute,
section 10(b) of the '34 Act .4

Noting that section 10(b) forbids

''any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," the Court
reasoned that Green, the plaintiff-respondent, had failed to show
either manipulation or deception, and thus had failed to state a
cause of action under section 10(b).
The Court easily eliminated deception from the plaintiff's
cause of action, since neither the court of appeals nor the trial court
45
had found any colorable deception in the plaintiff's complaint. 0
To substantiate the conclusion that the plaintiff had not alleged
any section 10(b) manipulation, the Court relied on Hochfelder
and its restrictive "term of art" interpretation of "manipulation"
Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAw. 699
(1975).
The constructive deceit cases of other circuits have been construed as endorsing equitable fraud. See cases cited in note 417 supra.
451. In Travis v. Anthas Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held
that self-dealing by corporate insiders was actionable without any proof of deception if it
resulted in a substantial diminution of the plaintiff's stock or dividends. Id. at 527.
The court said that "mere internal corporate mismanagement" would not be actionable
under rule lOb-5. Id.
452. St. Louis Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 412 F. Supp.
45 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); Bryan v.
Block 8&Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d
563 (5th Cir. 1974); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969),
modified, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Petitt v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
453. 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
454. "Ernst 6 Ernst [v. Hochfelder] makes clear that in deciding whether a complaint
states a cause of action for 'fraud' under Rule 10b-5, 'we turn first to the language of
§ 10(b).'" 97 S. Ct. at 1300 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring))).
455. "[T]he case comes to us on the premise that the complaint failed to allege a
material misrepresentation or material failure to disclose. The finding of the District Court,
undisturbed by the Court of Appeals, was that there was no 'omission' or 'misstatement.'"
97 S.Ct. at 1301.
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as "practices, such as wash sales, . . . that are intended to mislead

'456
investors by artificially affecting market activity.
Another section of this article has criticized Hochfelder's interpretation of "manipulation. ' 4 7 The point emphasized there is
that the word is imbued with a sufficiently clear, ordinary meaning so that the Court's reliance on the narrow "term of art" definition, provided neither by the statute nor the legislative history,
seems unjustified. Furthermore, Santa Fe violates one of the fundamental principles of statutory construction, which demands that
statutory language be interpreted as providing content beyond that
provided by the other language of that statute.458 The Court restricted "manipulation" to market manipulations which depend
for their success on nondisclosure, 45 9 thereby robbing "manipulative" of any effect beyond that of "deceptive." The court might
have attributed independent significance to "manipulative" by
construing it as including "manipulation of the financial affairs 46
of0
the corporation to the . .. personal ends" of corporate insiders.
Such an interpretation, incorporating equitable fraud within section 10(b), would have been more consistent with the principles of
statutory construction and with the role of section 10(b) as a general anti-fraud provision.41
In Santa Fe, the Court buttressed its interpretation of "manipulation" with two arguments based on its understanding of the
congressional intent behind section 10(b). First, the Court reasoned
that Congress would not "have chosen this 'term of art' if it had
meant to bring within the scope of § 10(b) instances of corporate
456. Id. at 1302. "Manipulation is 'virtually a term of art when used in connection
with securities markets.'" Id. (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199).
457. See text accompanying notes 268-74 supra.
458. "'The good expositor . .. makes every sentence have its operation to suppress
all the mischiefs; he gives effect to every word of the statute; he does not construe it so
that anything should be vain or superfluous . . . ."' Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N.Y.
612, 616, 47 N.E. 915, 916 (1897) (emphasis added) (quoting Lord Coke, Coke's Rep., part
VII at 310).
459. The Court conceded that "nondisclosure is usually essential to the success of a
[term of art] manipulative scheme." 97 S.Ct. at 1302.
460. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Garfinkle, [1969-1970] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,427, at 98,019 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1969). The court in Continental Bank found this
manipulation sufficient to state a cause of action under rule lOb-5.
461. "Subsection ([b]) says, 'thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.' . . . Of
course subsection ([b]) is a catch-all to prevent manipulative devices." Testimony of
Thomas C. Corcoran, General Counsel of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Hearings of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
115 (1934).
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mismanagement such as this, in which the essence of the complaint
is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary."4 2 Second,
the Court reasoned that its restrictive interpretation of "manipulative" was appropriate because "the Court repeatedly has described
the 'fundamental purpose' of the Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has occurred,
the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential
concern of the statute." 4 3 In sum, the Court argued that Congress
intended no more by the '34 Act than to promote full disclosure,
and that the legislature certainly had no intention of creating federal supervision of fiduciary relationships.
The legislative history, however, does not support those arguments. Congress did intend to create some federal fiduciary responsibilities:
Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary re-

lationship-a guarantee of "straight shooting"-supports a constant
expansion of mutual confidence which is the foundation of a complicated economic system, easy liquidity of resources in which
wealth is concentrated is a danger rather than a prop to the stability
of that system. 46

Congress did not, however, intend that the duty to disclose be the
sole duty imposed by the '34 Act. "Speculation, manipulation, investor's ignorance, .

-

. and disregard of fiduciary relationships by

those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries are all a seamless
web. None of these evils can be isolated for cure by itself alone."40

Since Congress felt that "investor's ignorance" could not "be isolated for cure by itself alone," an interpretation of section 10(b) as
providing only for disclosure without reaching "disregard of fidu-

ciary relationships" clearly contradicts congressional intent. Indeed, these passages from the legislative history seem to be an
invitation to the development of a federal common law of fiduciary
relationships, especially in light of the pre-Erie411 enactment of the
'34 Act.
The Court in Santa Fe expressed two further objections to the
plaintiff's rule 1Ob-5 complaint: the existence of a remedy at state
462. 97 S. Ct. at 1302.
463. Id.
464. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 90, at 6.
465. Id. at 7.
466. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law,4 7 and the difficulty of restricting the principles invoked by the
court of appeals within bounds appropriate to the '34 Act. 8 Both
of these arguments assume that federal scrutiny of fiduciary standards must be subordinated to state law. This assumption is consistent with the notion that the '34 Act's sole purpose was the
promotion of full disclosure. Both ideas are mistaken. Section 10(b)
and rule 1Ob-5 "are a part of a statutory scheme which had as its
purpose the creation of a new federal law of management-stockholder relations and which, therefore, may not be subordinated to
. . . state policy ... ."I Thus "[w]hen conduct by an 'insider'
• . . is challenged under the general language of section 10(b), ....

interstitial supplementation [of those generalities] is a matter of
470
federal law."
2. The Impact of Santa Fe v. Green. Santa Fe, then, is an
application of the principle of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins471 to the law
of corporate fiduciary duties: the Court disclaims any federal statutory preemption of this legal doctrine, leaving the states as the
sole source of the law. The actual effect of Santa Fe, however, may
be quite limited, since the Court specifically approved the con-

structive deceit cases, "all of which involved an element of deception as part of the fiduciary misconduct held to violate rule lOb5 ."472 A breach of fiduciary duty, then, remains actionable under
rule 1Ob-5 as long as some element of deception, either actual or
constructive, accompanies that breach. Since failure to disclose
such a breach of duty can itself constitute a material omission violative of rule lOb-5, 473 a breach of state law fiduciary duty is, without
467. "A factor in determining whether Congress intended to create a federal cause of
action in these circumstances is 'whether the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated
to state law..... 97 S.Ct. at 1303.
468.
The reasoning behind a holding that the complaint in this case alleged fraud
under Rule lOb-5 could not be easily contained. It is difficult to imagine . . .
how a court could distinguish the alleged abuses in these going private transactions
from other types of fiduciary self-dealing involving transactions in securities. The
result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation.
97 S.Ct. at 1303.
469. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (1961).
470. Friendy, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 414 (1964).
471. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
472. 97 S.Ct. at 1301 n.15.
473. Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
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more, actionable under rule 1Ob-5 if that breach is not disclosed.
If the Court is truly willing to accept the full range of constructive deceit cases, then the effect of Santa Fe will be slight.474
More consonant with the Court's emphasis on full disclosure, however, would be a return to the distinction made by Popkin v.
Bishop:475 constructive deceit is appropriate only if the complaint
involves transactions not requiring shareholder approval. If such
approval is sought, and full disclosure made to the shareholders,
the plaintiff must seek his remedy at state rather than federal law.
The irony of this, of course, is that the plaintiff in Santa Fe may
have lost his case by simply failing to allege that the unfair merger
terms were a misrepresentation of the true value of his shares.470
The effect of Santa Fe may be further limited were the SEC
to adopt one of its proposed rules477 intended to forbid "going private" transactions.4 78 Since section 13(e) 479 of the '34 Act under
which the rules would be promulgated clearly grants the SEC the
authority to regulate such transactions4 0 the Court would not be
able to exclude them from federal jurisdiction. Section 13(e), in
fact, may provide sufficient authority for the SEC to regulate all
short-form mergers, since it allows the agency to forbid not only
"deceptive and manipulative" purchases by a corporation of its
own shares, but "fraudulent" purchases as well.4 s ' Since "fraudulent" cannot be restricted to the "term of art" meaning ascribed to
"manipulative" in Hochfelder and Santa Fe, the SEC seems to have
474. See notes 414-22 supra & accompanying text.
475. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
476. See note 437 supra. The Court's deference, in Santa Fe, to the existence of a
state remedy for short-form mergers may preclude the use of constructive deceit even in
some cases involving transactions such as short-form mergers, which do not require shareholder approval. (Only six justices subscribed to this deference to state law: Brennan, J.,
dissented, and Stevens and Blackmun, J.J., filed concurrences refraining from joining that
portion of the Court's opinion.) Constructive deceit may, therefore, be disallowed in rule
1Ob-5 cases involving transactions for which exclusive remedies have been provided by state
legislatures; or in cases involving insider conduct which has been specifically exonerated by
the state legislature or judiciary.
477. SEC proposed rules 13-3A and 13e-3B, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 11231, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947 (Feb. 24, 1975).
478. See note 447 supra.
479.

15 U.S.C. § 70m (e) (1970).

480. The statute authorizes the SEC to regulate purchases by a corporation of its
own shares which the SEC deems to be fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive. The Court

must accept the SEC's determination that a going private transaction is fraudulent unless
the SEC is "clearly erroneous."
481. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (e) (1970).
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a clearer mandate to prohibit equitable fraud under section 13(e)
than under section 10(b).
The immediate effect of Santa Fe, therefore, is limited by its
apparent acceptance of the constructive deceit doctrine. The spirit
of Santa Fe and other recent rule 1Ob-5 cases, 41 however, suggests
that the Court would be willing to restrict that doctrine.4 The
long-term effect of Santa Fe may well be circumscribed by proposed
-and not yet proposed-rules under section 13(e) of the '34 Act.
Nonetheless, by stripping section 10(b)'s use of "manipulative" of
any meaning independent of that contained in "deceptive," the
Supreme Court has effectively nullified subsections 1 and 3 of rule
10b-5. At most, they can serve those courts which are willing to use
them to rationalize a broadening of the subsection 2 cause of
action.484

VIII. A

FINAL COMMENT

In order to provide a cohesive structure for some of the trends
apparent in the preceding discussion of individual elements of a
rule 1Ob-5 cause of action, it may be helpful to construct and examine a simple model of the type of situation that section 10(b)
and rule 1Ob-5 are intended to regulate. This model, which will be
called a communications model, is nothing more than a reconstruction of the essential components of a fraud. An important aspect of
the model involves working out the consequences4 5of a clear distinction between misleading and misrepresenting.
Misrepresentation consists in making a statement, the content
of which fails to correspond with an accurate description of a past,
present or future state of affairs. More abstractly, the propositional
content of the sentences contained in the misrepresentation has the
truth value "false." Misleading, on the other hand, consists in convincing the person with whom one is communicating (hereinafter
called the hearer) to accept that a particular state of affairs exists.
The hearer is not necessarily misled when someone (hereinafter
482. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
483. See text accompanying notes 474-76 supra.
484. See text accompanying notes 392-413 supra.
485. Fraser, No Conversation Without Misrepresentation (Boston Univ. Mimeo 1976).
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called the speaker) makes a misrepresentation to him: he may be
sufficiently skeptical or informed not to become confused, or he
may be familiar enough with the speaker to realize that the speaker
is not being serious, but instead ironical or witty. On the other
hand, it is possible that the hearer may be misled without any obvious misrepresentation having been made, as, for example, when
the information transmitted is not complete enough to make accurate comprehension possible. This type of misrepresentation is
generally referred to in securities law as an omission or non-disclosure. Misleading, in short, refers to the effect of a communication
on the hearer. This effect certainly correlates with the content of
the speaker's message, but is also somewhat independent of it, the
effect of a message being to some extent determined by the hearer
and the context.
Misrepresentation by the speaker may be intentional or unintentional. Not all falsehoods are uttered knowingly: they may be
the result of a slip of the tongue, or the speaker himself may simply
be misinformed. Misleading may also be accomplished with or without intent: accidentally misleading the hearer is always possible if
the speaker fails to keep account of the context of the hearer's
probable knowledge. The intent to mislead usually-although perhaps not always-is associated with the intent to misrepresent, but
the opposite connection (from intentional misrepresentation to intentional misleading) is (given jokes, irony, metaphor, and carelessness) on the average somewhat looser.
Note that the meaning of "misleading" in the preceding paragraphs is slightly different from that normally given to the term in
securities litigation, where no clear distinction is drawn between
the adequacy of the representation and the effect of a representation on the hearer. The more precise definition aids in providing
a structure for the various aspects of rule 1Ob-5 doctrine.
A.

The Individual Elements

If defined as the intent to defraud,"" the notion of scienter
appears to refer to misleading rather than to misrepresentation,
but this may not always be the case. If recklessness 4 7 is included
within the meaning of scienter, the intent to mislead is necessarily
486.
487.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214.
See note 272 supra.
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more diffuse and the speaker's willingness to tolerate a misrepresentation plays a more important analytical role. From this willingness to tolerate misrepresentation an inference must then be drawn
back to an intent to mislead.
Proof of materiality 4 8 and reliance4 89 aids in the construction
of a causal link between the misrepresentation and its effect: misleading. Requiring proof of materiality serves at least two purposes.
It removes from consideration those aspects of language or communication that do not have any influence on how the hearer
modifies his perception of the situation; it also limits attention to
information of potential interest to an investor, no other kinds of
information being relevant in an action brought under rule lOb5. 490 The current definition of materiality (the "would" standard)491
places an additional limitation on the possible links between misrepresentation and misleading. Of the conceivable reactions to
misrepresentation, only some will be held to be reasonable misleadings.492 This follows from the factual framework. Reasonable participants in the securities markets share certain basic knowledge
and assumptions; furthermore, the context created by the market
provides a fairly stable background in terms of which information
can be interpreted. 49 3 Since all misrepresentations gather much of
their import both from the context in which they are uttered and
from the knowledge of the hearer, the existence of standard assumptions about the context in which securities transactions occur and
about the knowledge that all reasonable investors possess restricts
the possible interpretations of a particular communication.
Reliance complements materiality by emphasizing the subjectivity of being, in fact, misled. 9 Thus interpreted, it is the
488. See text accompanying notes 90-133 supra.
489. See text accompanying notes 134-96 supra.
490. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449; Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d at 1302.
491. 426 U.S. at 449.
492. See text accompanying notes 108-12 supra. The "would" standard imposes upon
plaintiffs a requirement of proof that "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote," and that "under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
See also text accompanying notes 130-31 supra.
493. This is similar to the acceptance of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code

of contractual interpretations based on course of dealing, course of performance, and usage
of the trade. U.C.C. §§ 2-208, 1-205.
494. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
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counterpart on the hearer's side to scienter on the speaker's side of
the communication. From this point of view it is not much of a
fiction to presume reliance in omission cases, because the plaintiff
has actually been misled (by a lack of information). 4 5 Use of the
word "reliance" is just a somewhat restricted way of describing
hearer response; the suggested interpretation eliminates the apparent paradox of "relying" on information which has never been
physically transmitted.
Because of its dependence on the subjectivity of the hearer's
response, reliance is also the proper rubric under which to impose
any duties on the hearer to evaluate the representations of which
he learns. 496 Placing a requirement of diligence upon the hearer
reflects the fact that hearers generally process and transform the information they receive. As discussed above, the mere fact that a
misrepresentation has been made does not guarantee that the hearer
should or will be misled; such a result follows only if various conditions are met. Establishing minimum requirements of hearer
integrity (due diligence standards) is thus a necessary response to
the independence of misrepresentation from misleading. Other
solutions would only encourage disingenuousness on the part of
the hearer and impose strict liability on the speaker.
The aspects of causation 9 7 that bear upon the connection between misrepresentation and misleading also mirror the structure
of communication; that is, they require for their analysis an application of the communications model to the specific facts of a particular case. Those aspects which deal with the ascertainment of
loss, on the other hand, no longer have communication as their
concern, but rather attempt to aid in establishing a more general
prerequisite for private actions: damages. 08 That the class of persons found to have been damaged is smaller than that to which
misrepresentations are made is the holding of Birnbaum and Blue
Chip;499 that loss does not always accompany misrepresentation is

certainly true, independently of these two cases. What conclusions
should be drawn from this fact will be discussed toward the end of
this section.
Causation and damages are totally independent of the other
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

See text accompanying
See text accompanying
See text accompanying
See text accompanying
See text accompanying

notes 147-S0 supra.
notes 175-86 supra.
notes 197-256 supra.
notes 303-77 supra.
notes 1-89 supra.
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elements here under discussion in the case of short-form mergers."'
Despite full and accurate information to the shareholders who are
being squeezed out-that is, despite the absence of misrepresentation and the irrelevance of materiality and reliance-those holders
suffer injury. Such mergers are not only not misrepresentation cases
(since all the representations are true); in a way, they do not even
involve the hearers (stockholders), because the information which
the hearers receive is valueless to them (their vote is not required
to effect the merger). Perhaps the only reason any information is
transmitted at all is to protect those responsible for the merger
from liability under rule lOb-5. 501 Under conditions in which the
existence of communication becomes irrelevant, the meaning of
terms like "manipulative device" in section 10(b) and rule lOb-5(l)
becomes crucial, since such devices can exist without regard to communication between the parties. An analysis of rule 1Ob-5 which
concludes that the rule prohibits all manipulation would necessarily eliminate all elements of the cause of action which relate
either to the mediation of intent (scienter) or to the transmission
of knowledge (materiality, reliance, causation), and would instead
develop rules stated in terms of the effects wrought by managerial
or similar activity. 5 2 Unlike a communications model, which is
dyadic (concerned with the interrelationshipbetween speaker and
hearer), the model of pure manipulation considers only the acts of
the manipulator and the financial (not mental) effects which those
acts create. The manipulated (hearers) are relevant only because
they become enmeshed in the financial consequences, with or without activity on their part.
Note, however, that despite the relatively obvious applicability of a non-communications model to short-form mergers, an argument can be made that a communications model exists as well. The
argument proceeds as follows: the '34 Act was concerned with the
generation and protection of information upon which persons in
the securities markets could base decisions.50 3 This orientation
500. See text accompanying notes 423-49 supra.
501. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
502. The Supreme Court refused to adopt this approach, however, and construed the
use of "manipulative" in a "term of art" sense which makes manipulation a subset of,
rather than an alternative to deception. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292
(1977). See notes 266-74 & 453-70 supra & accompanying text. See also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
503. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 90; S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934), reprintedin llA-Pt. 2C BusINEsS ORGANIZATIONS 5-35 to 5-422 (N. Gadsby ed. 1971).
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toward decision-making presupposes that efforts will be exerted to
preserve the possibility that decisions can in fact be made. This
presupposition is shared by all models of open information exchange. Short-form mergers violate the presupposition because they
provide information and then prohibit all but one course of action.
Limiting responses to the one chosen by the provider of information precludes making a decision, that is, a choice between two or
more alternatives. Thus, although no misrepresentations have been
made, a graver offense has been committed: the very reason for the
existence of an informational market has been subverted. In contrast to such subversion, the transmission of misinformation appears
almost as a formal, rather than a substantive, violation of the '34
Act.
The general model of misrepresentation, a sketch of which
was just completed, must be supplemented to provide an adequate
analysis of communication in the securities markets. First, it should
be noted that almost all activities in the securities markets are
treated by the participants in the markets as of symbolic import.
Almost any activity will be perceived as more significant than an
ordinary act in everyday life because all market activity is accompanied by a strong presumption that it is motivated by information
about economic value. The motivation behind activity in the market renders that activity a representationof that motivation. Under
this analysis, use of "manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances" becomes a form of misrepresentation; and the emphasis on
disclosure and on the elements of common law fraud in rule 1Ob-5
litigation may be understood as symptomatic of a deep conceptual
unity.
There is a further way in which communication in the market
differs from everyday talk. The great concern for the symbolic import of action which was mentioned above means that the number
of inferential steps between the intent to misrepresent and the intent to mislead is reduced. Knowledge that others will attribute
more than casual significance to an action or representation implies
that the chances are greater that misrepresentations are meant to
mislead. This follows from the general organization of all communication around the speaker's expectations of what the hearer
expects from him, a kind of complicated reflexivity that people
quickly learn to take for granted. For actions under rule 1Ob-5 the
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greater closeness of misrepresentation and misleading has an interesting theoretical consequence: proof of lack of scienter should perhaps be required of every defendant against whom a prima facie
case has been made. Note also that claims that the provider of information knew of all the potential inferences become more plausible where the information concerned involved numbers. An interesting trait of numerical information is that inferences may be
drawn from it with fair precision. It is therefore to be expected
that more, and more distant, inferences will be drawn from numerical than from non-numerical information.
B.

Recent Trends
The communication model has now been sufficiently explicated to permit an evaluation of some of the recent trends in the
interpretation of rule 1Ob-5. The most recent Supreme Court decisions have dealt with materiality,504 the Birnbaum rule," 5 scienter50 and equitable fraud;5 0 7 each of these decisions effectively
narrowed the rights of the plaintiff in private actions for damages.
In providing a rationale for restricting those rights, the decisions
refer most often to the sheer volume of litigation which could arise
under more liberal readings of the relevant statutes. Concern about
voluminous litigation and creeping domination of all corporate
law by rule 1Ob-5 has been expressed by the courts for some time.508
The concern about the volume of litigation can be treated in
three ways: (1) the courts can attach ad hoc restrictions to the relevant doctrine as judicially interpreted; (2) they can develop principled limitations on rights of actions, based on the fundamental
elements of the doctrine being applied; or, (3) they can apply general filtering devices of an appropriate sort (for example, rebuttable
presumptions in areas where evidentiary problems could lead to
protracted litigation and inflated settlement values).
The decision to require a "would" standard for materiality in
TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway, Inc.50 9 could be classified under
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
Inc., 384
509.

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
426 U.S. 438.
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the second of the above methods. In fact, "would" may merely spell
out implications of the reasonable man concept.' 10 "Might" often
indicates an expectation that no one would expect to be satisfied.
To the extent that the "would" standard eliminates the use of improbable expectations, it fosters the establishment of shared assumptions about the usefulness of information. Shared assumptions are
the essence of the reasonable man concept. They are the background against which the information provided about or through
the securities markets is interpreted. Without these shared and
somewhat idealized assumptions of the "would" standard, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to attain a consistent evaluation of
this information. In sum, the "would" standard articulated in TSC
Industries11 is not only consistent with the communications model
sketched above; it may also be a tacit assumption of any communications model.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Blue Chip 12 and Hochfelder513 do not fit as easily within method two, although the manner
in which they are reasoned suggests that the Court would so categorize them. Limiting standing to purchasers or sellers, as Birnbaum 514 and Blue Chip51 5 do, accords with the metaphor of the
market place and with the common law image of the defrauded
sucker. In so limiting the eligible complainants, the Court also
restricts rule 1Ob-5 cases to less than the entire area delimited by
the elements of causation and damages (or loss), and thus does not
offer relief in all cases of misleading-much less of misrepresentation." 6
One manner in which the volume of litigation could be restricted without potential theoretical conflict with the underlying
model, would be to utilize the third method listed above by estab510. Id. at 449.
511. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
512. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
513. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
514. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
515. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
516. If a theory of rule lob-5 were to develop around the standing restrictions of
Blue Chip, therefore, that theory would not be a model of communication, but rather a
model of damaged purchasers or sellers. That is, a theory based on the analogy of the
damaged purchaser' or seller is simply not identical with a theory based on an analogy to
misrepresentation in general. To a certain degree, therefore, the current standing limitations are in potential conflict with the claim that section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5 are the
modem progeny of the common law tort of misrepresentation. Either that, or those limitations represent a refusal to modify common law misrepresentation to accord with changed
circumstances.
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lishing several rebuttable presumptions concerning causation. A
purchaser or seller could be rebuttably presumed to satisfy the
causation requirements; non-purchasers and non-sellers could be
uniformly, or in various combinations, presumed not to satisfy
those requirements. The difficulties with the arguably undesirable
amounts of litigation would then be treated in accord with their
nature, as proof problems.
Hochfelder 517 also cannot be easily classified under method
two. The discussion earlier in this section indicates that scienter is
widespread in the kind of communication relevant in securities
litigation.51 8 On the other hand, the section of this article that analyzes the reasoning of the Hochfelder majority defends the claim
that scienter, as defined by the Court, cannot be located in the language of section 10(b) or rule 1 Ob-5. 51 The apparent paradox arises
because the Court's treatment of its own definition assumes that
the requisite scienter will be hard to find in the real world, and is
therefore incompatible with a finding of negligence. The communications model of this section, however, treats negligence and a
redefined version of scienter as compatible (note that all terms
within an articulated theory end up being redefined to a certain
extent), since understanding the representations, misrepresentations and omissions broadcast into the securities markets is part of
what it means to participate in those markets. A narrowed definition of the relevant understanding or knowledge, regardless of
whether it is called scienter, is inadequate to the job-undertaken
by the '33 and '34 Acts-of protecting the securities markets as they
exist today against manipulation. A model based on such a narrow
definition is not a model of the processes of information dispersal
which the law is supposed to protect.
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